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ABSTRACT
Is summary judgment constitutional? Scholars have passionately debated the question in recent
years. But they have made an important oversight. State courts hear more than fifty times as
many cases a year as federal courts do. Whatever state courts decide with regard to summary
judgment will affect vastly more litigants than what federal courts do. At the same time, states
have largely adopted federal summary judgment standards and cases interpreting them. Yet
scholars considering whether summary judgment is constitutional have focused all of their
attention on the Seventh Amendment. They have entirely failed to consider state constitutional
jury trial guarantees. This matters doctrinally because state constitutions use different language
to enshrine the right to a jury trial than the Seventh Amendment, and those provisions have
a different history than the Seventh Amendment. Ironically, the issue surrounding summary
judgment's constitutionality that is the most important-whether it violates state constitutionshas received the least scholarly attention.
This Article is the first to consider whether summary judgment is consistent with state
constitutional jury trial guarantees. After using the historical framework scholars have
invoked to assess whether summary judgment is constitutional at the federal level, it concludes
that summary judgment either violates or is in severe tension with several state constitutions.
This Article then examines the texts of state constitutional jury trial provisions and finds
that, in several, those texts do not permit summary judgment. The Article also finds it highly
questionable whether summary judgment is consistent with a living constitutionalist framework
or survives heightened scrutiny. The Article expands on existing scholarship exploring summary
judgment's constitutionality at the federal level and explains how and when that scholarship
will not be useful to states considering summary judgment under their own constitutions.
The Article ends by asking states to settle a debate that only they can. In taking cases from juries,
summary judgment really asks us to decide why we have juries and what role we expect them
to play. Do we have juries so they can check judges, to confer legitimacy on the legal process,
to provide a forum for ordinary citizens to weigh in on what the law is and how it functions, or
because they bring unique strengths to the adjudicative process? The answer to that question
determines not only whether summary judgment is constitutional, but what the standard for
granting it should be, and how often courts should be willing to grant it. The difficulty of amending
the federal constitution means that debates about summary judgment's constitutionality will
remain frozen in 1791. But given the relative ease of amending state constitutions, ordinary
Americans have a ready mechanism to clarify the role of ordinary citizens in the legal system.
68 UCLA L. REV. 988 (2021)
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INTRODUCTION

The federal court system long ago embraced summary judgment to keep
juries from deciding cases. Rule 56 allows a judge to decide a case without a jury
trial when "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law."' The judge will usually consider the
evidence the parties would use at trial and rule in favor of one of the parties if the
judge believes the law requires a decision one way or the other,? or that a
reasonable jury would have to decide the case a particular way.3
While predecessor state and English summary judgment statutes allowed
summary judgment in only limited cases, Rule 56 applies in all cases.4 After a
debate about how broadly Rule 56 swept, the U.S. Supreme Court embraced
aggressive use of summary judgment in the so-called Celotex trilogy. The Court
made clear that summary judgment was not a disfavored procedural shortcut, but
a valuable tool to filter out meritless cases. The result? If a judge forms a
hypothesis that a reasonable jury would have to resolve a case a certain way,
an actual jury never has to confirm it. 6 There is considerable evidence that after
the Celotextrilogy, federal judges have granted summary judgment motions much
more frequently than they did before; one study, for example, found that Maryland
federal judges granted summary judgment twice as often as they had before.'
That the founding fathers cherished juries so much that they included a civil
jury trial guarantee in the Seventh Amendment' has not diminished federal
courts' enthusiasm for summary judgment.
State courts have overwhelmingly decided to lockstep. First, though some
already had limited versions of summary judgment, many adopted the federal
system's more robust version.9 Second, the overwhelming majority of state

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

8.
9.

FED. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
Id.
Morris v. McCarthy, 825 F.3d 658,663 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (reversing a summary judgment grant
because a reasonable jury could have found that racial discrimination occurred).
Ilana Haramati, ProceduralHistory: The Development of Summary Judgment as Rule 56, 5
N.Y.U. J.L. &LIBERTY 173, 174 (2010).
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242
(1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
Liberty Lobby,477 U.S. at251.
Arthur R. Miller, The PretrialRushto Judgment: Are the "LitigationExplosion," "Liability
Crisis," andEfficiency Cliches Eroding Our Day in Court andJury Trial Commitments?,
78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 982, 1049 (2003).
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
Jeffrey O. Cooper, Summary Judgment in the Shadow of Erie, 43 AKRON L. REv. 1245, 1246
(2010) ("Twenty-four jurisdictions-twenty-two states plus the District of Columbia and
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courts have adopted the Celotex trilogy in whole or in part.10 This has profound
implications for litigants' right to a jury trial, which state constitutions often
guarantee more emphatically than the federal constitution does. This is because
state courts hear many more cases than federal courts. In 2015, Americans filed
fifteen million civil cases in state court." By contrast, in 2017, Americans filed a
comparatively paltry 292,000 civil cases in federal court.1 2 It is no exaggeration to
say that if Americans cannot get a jury trial at the state level, most will be unable to
get one at all. Along these lines, if states were to become more skeptical of
summary judgment, narrowly apply it, or even preclude its use entirely, more
litigants would have a chance at the jury trial (almost all of) their state constitutions
guarantee them.
In fact, states' decisions to lockstep their summary judgment standards with
federal ones raises a troubling question state courts have largely ignored and
scholars have completely ignored. Do federal summary judgment standardsand indeed summary judgment itself-violate state constitutional provisions
declaring the right to a jury trial inviolate?
In recent years, scholars have debated whether summary judgment in federal
courts is constitutional. This began when Suja Thomas famously asserted that,
under the Supreme Court's historical approach to interpreting the Seventh
Amendment, summary judgment violated the right to trial by jury.13 Her
thought-provoking article spawned a wave of thoughtful responses defending
summary judgment's constitutionality. The debate laid bare multiple important
issues: to what extent summary judgment was analogous to common law
procedural devices the founding fathers would have recognized, the purpose ofthe
jury, and whether an originalist approach was really the right way to interpret the
Seventh Amendment. As interesting and potentially important as the debate has
been, it has made a major oversight. No scholar has investigated whether

10.

11.

12.

13.

Guam-currently have summary judgment rules that closely parallel the text of Federal Rule
56.").
Zachary D. Clopton, ProceduralRetrenchment and the States, 106 CALIF. L. REv. 411, 476-480,
app.2 (2018) (providing a list of decisions citing to the Celotex trilogy, positively or
negatively).
RICHARD Y. SCHAUFFLER, ROBERT C. LAFOUNTAIN, SHAUNA M. STRICKLAND, KATHRYN A. HOLT
& KATHRYN J. GENTHON, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN OVERVIEW OF 2015
STATE COURT CASELOADS 4 (2016).
U.S. COURTS, U.S. DISTRICT COURTS-CIVIL CASES COMMENCED, TERMINATED, AND
PENDING DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIODS ENDING MARCH 31, 2016 AND 2017, at 1,

https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/fjcs_c_0331.2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5DKF-G59V].
Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 139, 140
(2007).
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summary judgment is consistent with state constitutional guarantees. That is,
the debate about summary judgment that may be the most important has
received the least scholarly attention. State courts that have considered the issue
have typically given it short shrift.14
In stepping into that gap, this Article has three goals. First, it shows that in
many states, both summary judgment itself and federal summary judgment
standards raise grave constitutional questions because they potentially deprive
litigants of their right to a jury trial. Second, it demonstrates that in other states, a
debate about whether summary judgment is unconstitutional will have to operate
on different terms than the one at the federal level. Specifically, while the debate
Thomas inaugurated has focused on whether summary judgment is analogous to
common law procedural devices designed to keep cases from juries in use when
the Seventh Amendment was ratified in 1791,15 several states need not employ
this historical approach to interpret their jury trial guarantees. Moreover, as the
Seventh Amendment is not incorporated against the states, state courts may
choose not to follow Seventh Amendment jurisprudence. 16
Finally, it asks for states to provide clarity in a way that only they can amout
how much value our society still places on juries. The debate about whether
summary judgment is constitutional and under what conditions courts should
employ it is really a debate about the proper role of laypeople in the legal system
going forward. This debate is one that federal courts interpreting the Seventh
Amendment and scholarship focused on it cannot answer because they are
focused on the past. Given how difficult it is to amend the federal constitution, that
will not change. But, since it is much easier to amend state constitutions, states
have more flexibility to address summary judgment and the proper role of juries
in the future. Far from a dry procedural mechanism, summary judgment should
cause us to ask big, important questions. Why do we have juries in the first place?
What strengths and weaknesses do they bring to the adjudicative process? Is it
really better to have judges deciding cases instead of juries? How much of a
premium should the legal system put on efficiency?
State constitutional
amendments are the most realistic avenue for laypeople to have a voice on the
crucial question ofwhat role laypeople should continue to play in the legal system.

14.

15.
16.

Eg., Anglin v. Johnson Reg'l Med. Ctr., 289 S.W.3d 28,35 (Ark. 2008) (finding that summary
judgment did not violate Arkansas's civil jury trial right, in three sentences and without
engaging whether the text of the provision supported its conclusion); Diekan v. Blackwelder,
2011 Mass. App. Div. 66,67 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 2011) (acknowledging Thomas's argument that
summary judgment is unconstitutional but not engaging with it).
Dimickv. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474,476 (1935).
Ann M. Scarlett, Jury Trial Disparities Between Class Actions and Shareholder Derivative
Actions in State Courts, 72 OKLA. L. REV. 283,287 (2019).
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This Article proceeds in six Parts. The first traces the rise of summary
judgment from state prototypes into a dominant procedural mechanism at the
federal level which states then imitated. The second situates this Article in the
context of existing scholarship about summary judgment's constitutionality to
illustrate the need for sustained scholarly attention to state jury trial guarantees.
The third uses the historical approach that dominates debate about the
Seventh Amendment and summary judgment, and which the text of several state
jury trial provisions requires, to demonstrate that summary judgment is
unconstitutional in at least some states. A historical inquiry reveals that the
generations who wrote and adopted jury trial guarantees envisioned a much more
expansive role for juries-such as allowing them to interpret the law-that
precludes summary judgment.
The fourth looks to the text of state constitutional provisions themselves with
dual purposes: to show that the text of many state jury trial guarantees puts
summary judgment in constitutional doubt and to supplement the existing debate
about the constitutionality of summary judgment. For the latter objective, it
illustrates that states which take up the important debate of whether summary
judgment is constitutional will have to proceed down a different path than the
one the debate about summary judgment and the Seventh Amendment has taken.
Where the debate about the federal constitution is a historical one, it is open to
serious question whether the text of many state jury trial guarantees requires a
historical inquiry. In other cases, where the Seventh Amendment's text is
maddeningly Delphic, the text of some state jury trial provisions is exquisitely clear
about whether summary judgment is permissible.
The fifth considers whether living constitutionalism can justify summary
judgment under state constitutional jury trial guarantees and whether summary
judgment might satisfy the sort of heightened scrutiny that sometimes allows the
It concludes that living
government to overcome individual rights.
constitutionalism will not support summary judgment in the many states whose
jury trial guarantees preclude resort to living constitutionalism, and that the way
summary judgment is now deployed contradicts the ethos of access to justice that
should be at the heart of a living constitution. It raises questions about whether
summary judgment can survive heightened scrutiny in other states.
The last explains why states that consider summary judgment's
constitutionality are uniquely positioned to help us decide what value we place on
juries today and what roles we think are appropriate for them. This work will be
beneficial, and not just in terms of deciding how to approach summary
judgment. Clarifying the roles juries should play will help states decide how to
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approach motions for directed verdicts and motions to dismiss for failure to state
a claim, which also implicate the division oflabor between judge and jury.

I.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL AND STATES' DECISIONS
TO LOCKSTEP

Summary judgment was unknown in federal court until the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in 1938." But it was not a new concept. Prior to 1934, several
states had developed summary judgment prototypes. 18 England, which supplied
America with the common law and the jury system, adopted summary judgment
procedures in particular cases in the 1855 Bills of Exchange Act. 19 Initially,
summary judgment was limited; it applied in cases where plaintiffs sought to
enforce promissory notes.2 0 In such cases, Parliament had become concerned that
defendants were often raising sham defenses to delay proceedings.2 1 In 1873,
Parliament expanded summary judgment into the realm of cases with written
documentation of debt or lawsuits for fixed amounts of money; only plaintiffs
could avail themselves of the remedy.2 2
At the same time, discontent with the federal court system was taking hold.
Critics lamented the number of cases23 and how long they took. By 1912, the
average litigant could expect to wait over four years to complete a case.2 4 The
Federal Rules Advisory Committee settled on summary judgment as a remedy. It
inspired considerable debate over, among other things, whether it infringed on the
right to jury trials,25 and whether it should be available in all lawsuits or only in
certain types. 26

17.
18.
19.
20.

Haramati, supranote 4, at 174.
For further discussion, see infra Subpart IV.C.
Miller, supra note 7, at 1017.
The Summary Procedureon Bills of Exchange Act, 1855, in THE COMMON LAw PROCEDURE
ACTS AND OTHER STATUTES RELATING TO THE PRACTICE OF THE SUPERIOR COURTS OF
COMMON LAW AND THE RULES OF COURT 382 (John C. Day ed., 4th ed. 1872).

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id.
Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873,36 & 37 Vict. c. 66, § 7, sch. 54 (Eng.).
By one count, the number of federal cases increased from 28,000 in 1876 to almost 90,000 in
1915. Haramati, supra note 4, at 188 n.118.
Id. at 188.
Id. at 197-98.
Id. at 195-96.
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For many years, summary judgment was a disfavored remedy.27 But that
changed with the Celotex trilogy in 1986. In Celotex itself,28 the Supreme Court
permitted moving parties to demonstrate that nonmoving parties lacked enough
evidence to carry their burden at trial, and held that they did not need to
affirmatively disprove elements of a plaintiff's claim. 29 Celotex emphasized that
summary judgment was "properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural
shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are
designed 'to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every
action.""' The Court justified this view of summary judgment because it needed
a screening mechanism since the notice pleading requirements could not filter
out many cases.31
In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby (the second case in the Celotex trilogy), the
Court fleshed out what a nonmoving party needed to do to defeat summary
judgment. It was not enough for the nonmoving party to present a "colorable"
claim.33 Instead, the nonmoving party needed to meet the same standard it
would on a motion for directed verdict: that its evidence was strong enough

Eg, Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Solomon, 529 F.2d 59, 61 (2d Cir. 1975) (describing summary
judgment as a "'drastic device"' (quoting Heyman v. Com. & Indus. Ins. Co., 524 F.2d 1317,
1320 (2d Cir. 1975))); Morrison Flying Serv. v. Deming Nat'l Bank, 340 F.2d 430, 432-33
(10th Cir. 1965) (observing that summary judgment "is drastic and should be applied with
caution to the end that litigants will have a trial on bona fide factual issues"); Shultz v. Mfrs.
Traders Trust Co., 1 F.R.D. 451, 452 (W.D.N.Y. 1940) ("The granting of summary judgment
is a drastic remedy.").
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
The U.S. Supreme Court held:
[U]nlike the Court of Appeals, we find no express or implied requirement in
Rule 56 that the moving party support its motion with affidavits or other
similar materials negating the opponent's claim. On the contrary, Rule 56(c),
which refers to "the affidavits, if any" (emphasis added), suggests the absence
of such a requirement.
Id. at 323.
Id. at 327.
The Court stated:
Before the shift to "notice pleading" accomplished by the Federal Rules, motions
to dismiss a complaint or to strike a defense were the principal tools by which
factually insufficient claims or defenses could be isolated and prevented from
going to trial with the attendant unwarranted consumption of public and
private resources. But with the advent of "notice pleading," the motion to
dismiss seldom fulfills this function any more, and its place has been taken by
the motion for summary judgment.
Id. By the Court's own logic, perhaps it should think about summary judgment differently in
light of subsequent decisions in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), which require plaintiffs to meet a higher pleading standard.
See infra Conclusion.
477 U.S. 242 (1986).
Id.at249-50.
&

27.

28.
29.

30.
31.

32.
33.
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for a reasonable jury to find in its favor.34 A "mere ... scintilla" of evidence
was insufficient.3 5 Crucially, the Court held that the obligation to offer more
than a scintilla of evidence remained, on an issue of whether a publisher had
"actual malice" in a libel case, even though "the evidence [wa] s likely to be within
the possession of the defendant."3 6 The Court did caution that "[c]redibility
determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate
inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.""
Finally, in Matsushita ElectronicIndustrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.3" (the
third case in the Celotex trilogy), the Supreme Court considered the standard for
summary judgment in antitrust cases. Specifically, although courts were
normally supposed to make all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, 39 in
antitrust cases, plaintiffs had to "show that the inference of conspiracy is
reasonable in light of the competing inferences ofindependent action or collusive
action that could not have harmed respondents."" The Court conducted its own
inquiry into whether the defendant had a "plausible" motive to engage in a
conspiracy and found that, on the existing record, there was not.41 Absent what
the Court found to be such a plausible motive, the plaintiff could only show a
"genuine" issue suitable for jury trial if it could present evidence "`ten[ding] to
exclude the possibility' that petitioners underpriced respondents to compete for
business rather than to implement an economically senseless conspiracy.""
Empirical research suggests that federal courts granted summary judgment more
often after the Celotex trilogy.43
44
The Supreme Court added further teeth to Rule 56 in Scott v. Harris.
In
Scott, a motorist asserted a 42 U.S.C. §1983 claim against a police officer for
ramming his car during a high speed chase.45 The maneuver succeeded in
stopping the car, but paralyzed the motorist. 46 Relying on the traditional
admonition to consider the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

34.
35.
36.

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 251 ("[T]he 'genuine issue' summary judgment standard is 'very close' to the 'reasonable
jury' directed verdict standard .... ").
Id. at 252.
Id. at 257.
Id. at 255.
475 U.S. 574 (1986).
Id. at 587.
Id. at 588.
Id. at 596-97.
Id. at 597-98 (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984)).
See generally Miller, supra note 7, at 1048-56.
550 U.S. 372 (2007).
Id. at 375.
Id.
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party,47 the district court denied the officer's summary judgment motion on
qualified immunity grounds, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. 48 The parties
differed on whether the motorist was driving so dangerously that the officer's
actions were justified. The motorist asserted that he slowed for turns and
intersections, used his turn indicator, and never threatened to run other drivers
off the road.49 The officer disagreed, and the Court ultimately sided with him. It
relied on a videotape showing the motorist's "vehicle racing down narrow, twolane roads in the dead of night at speeds that are shockingly fast.... swerv[ing]
around more than a dozen other cars, cross [ing] the double-yellow line, and
forc [ing] cars traveling in both directions to their respective shoulders to avoid
being hit."" The Court relied on the tape to find that no reasonable jury could
possibly have ruled in the motorist's favor, notwithstanding the parties' dispute
of the facts.51 Admitting that "there is no obvious way to quantify the risks on
either side,"" the Court determined that the officer's actions were reasonable as a
matter of law after "tak[ing] into account not only the number of lives at risk, but
also their relative culpability."" In dissent, Justice Stevens questioned whether the
video really supported the majority's inference that a jury must find that the
officer behaved reasonably.54 Many states have approvingly cited Scott, and none
have rejected it." Apart from expanding summary judgment in the Celotex
trilogy, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment is
constitutional,56 and several lower federal courts have considered the issue.57

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 377.
Id. at 376.
Id. at 379.
Id.
Id. at 380.
Id. at 383-84.
Id. at 384.
Id. at 392-96 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Clopton, supra note 10, at 428.
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 336 (1979) (citing Fid. & Deposit Co. v. United
States, 187 U.S. 315, 319-21 (1902)).
Eg., McDaniel v. Kindred Hosp., Inc., 311 F. App'x 758 (6th Cir. 2009) (relying on Supreme
Court's decision in Parklane to reject argument that summary judgment is
unconstitutional); Cook v. McPherson, 273 F. App'x 421 (6th Cir. 2008) (same).
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Although several states have rejected the Celotex trilogy,58 the majority have
decided to follow one or all of the decisions. 59 Specifically, courts in Alabama,
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, the District of Columbia,
Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, Washington,
West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming have adopted the Celotex trilogy in
whole or in part.60 In some cases, courts adopted the trilogy without explicitly
discussing whether it was consistent with the state's preexisting case law on
summary judgment.6 1 Others devoted considerable discussion to harmonizing
the trilogy's interpretation of Rule 56 with their own rules on summary
judgment. 2
II.

THE LITERATURE ABOUT SUMMARY JUDGMENT'S CONSTITUTIONALITY

The decision to lockstep state summary judgment standards with federal
standards comes amid a debate over whether summary judgment is
constitutional given that it empowers judges to decide cases without juries even
though the Seventh Amendment guarantees a jury trial in "suits at common law,
where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars." 63 Suja Thomas
initiated this debate with her thoughtful article Why Summary Judgment Is
Unconstitutionalin the VirginiaLaw Review. 64
Acknowledging that many would see her position as "heretical," 65 Thomas
compared summary judgment as it has evolved to procedures in 1791, which is the

58.

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

E.g., Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476,482-83 (Ky. 1991) (declining
to adopt the federal standard for summary judgment because "we perceive no oppressive or
unmanageable case backlog or problems with unmeritorious or frivolous litigation in the
state's courts that would require us to adopt a new approach such as the new federal
standards"); First Union Nat'l Bank of Ga. v. J. Reisbaum Co., 378 S.E.2d 317, 319 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1989) (Birdsong & Beasley, JJ., concurring) (finding that, contrary to federal court
summary judgment jurisprudence, Georgia case law required a party moving for
summary judgment "to negate all material allegations made by the respondent, even those
as to which the respondent would have the burden of proof at trial") (collecting cases).
Clopton, supra note 10, at 432 tbl.B.
Id.
Eg., Greywolfv. Carroll, 151 P.3d 1234,1241 (Alaska 2007).
Eg., Kourouvacilisv. Gen. Motors Corp., 575 N.E.2d 734,740-41 (Mass. 1991).
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
Thomas, supra note 13.
Id. at 139.
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Supreme Court's approach to interpreting the Seventh Amendment.66 Thomas
found that none of the procedures allowing termination of cases prior to a jury's
involvement in 1791 meaningfully resembled summary judgment.
She
considered five common law devices that took cases from juries: demurrer,
demurrer to the evidence, nonsuit, special case, and orders for a new trial. Thomas
argued that, under the first four procedures, English courts in 1791 did not
consider whether a reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party or evaluate
evidence's sufficiency.6 7 For motions for new trial, she conceded that they allowed
judges to evaluate evidentiary sufficiency. 68 But, Thomas still found summary
judgment different because it allows a judge to decide which party wins a case while
a motion for a new trial sent the case to a different jury.69 All of these procedures
violated a core common law principle that either the parties themselves or juries
determined the facts, but not a judge.70 She then refuted three modern arguments
in favor of summary judgment, namely that (1) summary judgment was
constitutional because it merely permitted judges to decide legal questions, (2) the
Supreme Court has already upheld the constitutionality of summary judgment,
and (3) summary judgment was necessary to keep the legal system functioning."
Several scholars have pushed back. Edward Brunet asserted that summary
judgment was consistent with trialby inspection, a procedure he asserted was used
in 1791.7 Trial by inspection permitted a judge to "summon a party to the
courtroom, take evidence, and adjudicate a critical issue without the assistance
of a civil jury."73 Brunet cited evidence showing that English courts had
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 144; Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370,376 (1996).
Thomas, supra note 13, at 148-58.
Id. at 158.
Id.
Id. at 159.
Id. at 161-79.
Edward Brunet, Summary Judgment Is Constitutional,93 IOwA L. REv. 1625 (2008). See also
Luke Meier, Probability, Confidence, and the Constitutionalityof Summary Judgment, 42
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 2 (2014). Meier argued for a distinction between confidence-based
grants of summary judgment and probabilistic grants of summary judgment. Id.
Confidence-based grants involve a determination that there is not enough evidence for a
jury to make a finding; in this case, summary judgment was constitutional. Id. By contrast,
probabilistic grants involve a determination that the evidence makes it unreasonable for a
jury to make a particular finding; according to Meier, this does raise constitutional questions.

73.

Brunet, supra note 72, at 1631. Brunet cited an example given by Blackstone, where a minor
sued to recover a fine levied against him because of his age. Id. at 1632. Trial by inspection
permitted the judge to invite the plaintiff in and visually examine him to make a
determination without a jury. Id. For what it is worth, both William Nelson, a respected
historian on colonial America who has approved of summary judgment, and Thomas found
that trial by inspection is not analogous to summary judgment. Suja A. Thomas, Why
Summary Judgment Is Still Unconstitutional: A Reply to Professors Brunet and Nelson, 93

Id.
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routinely used trial by inspection and some showing that American courts had
occasionally embraced the practice.74 Brunet further argued that the historical
test demanded by the Seventh Amendment was not rigid, and summary
judgment was close enough to demurrer to the evidence to be constitutional.75
Meanwhile, William E. Nelson argued that courts should not limit
themselves to inquiring into what 1791 English common law permitted.76 Instead,
he argued, courts should treat the U.S. Constitution as a living document whose
meaning changed with the times." Under the Constitution as it stands today, he
argued that jury trials are less important than they were at the founding, and other
values, such as uniformity of legal interpretation, have become more important.78
Given that reality, summary judgment and motions to dismiss must be held
constitutional.
In focusing entirely on whether summary judgment is consistent with the
Seventh Amendment, this debate misses a critical perspective. What about the
fifty state constitutions? Is summary judgment consistent with jury guarantees in
them? These questions are not just important because they demonstrate a lack of
scholarly attention to the subject. They are important because, while state courts
handle the majority of cases in this country, many states use different wording in
their jury trialguarantees than the federal constitution does, and many states have
different historical considerations. The number of cases in state court dwarfs the
number in federal court. In 2015, Americans filed fifteen million civil cases in state

74.
75.
76.

77.
78.

IOWA L. REv. 1667, 1676-78 (2008) (comparing trial by inspection to the modern concept
of judicial notice after extensively reviewing the circumstances under which trial by
inspection was used historically); William E. Nelson, Summary Judgment and the
Progressive Constitution, 93 IowA L. REv. 1653, 1657-58 & n.18 (2008) ("I am inclined to
agree with Professor Thomas that this procedure was a distinctive quasi-administrative one,
rather than a device for controlling the discretion of a common-law jury."). Given that they
disagree on whether summary judgment is constitutional, their agreement in this regard is
telling.
Brunet, supra note 72, at 1636-41.
Id. at 1642.
Nelson, supra note 73, at 1658 ("The main problem is that freezing the law in 1791 makes no
sense: the Constitution created a society and economy that has catapulted forward since that
date, and to separate the law from that society and economy-to have the law function at cross
purposes-risks wreckage.").
See id.
Id. at 1662 ("Jurytrial has become, especially in civil cases, a legal siding. Relatively few jury
trials occur. Although jury duty could serve as an important device for citizens to participate
in government, citizens do not value it for that reason; few Americans are eager to perform
jury duty when called, and most try very hard to avoid it. The main function that the jury
can serve is to give local communities a mechanism for obstructing and even nullifying the
enforcement of metropolitan law-to protect the periphery from the center. But few
Americans really care about preserving local power.").
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court. 79 By contrast, in 2017, Americans filed only 292,000 civil cases in federal
court.8 0 That makes whatever states do with regard to jury trials much more
important than what the federal government does.
This Article is the first to consider summary judgment's constitutionality
under state jury trial guarantees.
III.

HISTORICAL INQUIRIES

As in the debate about summary judgment's constitutionality at the federal
level, many states are textually obligated to conduct a historical inquiry to assess
summary judgment's constitutionality. Massachusetts's jury trial guarantee, for
example, provides that "[i] n all controversies concerning property, and in all suits
between two or more persons, except in cases in which it has heretofore been
otherways used and practiced, the parties have a right to a trial by jury; and this
method of procedure shall be held sacred." 1 The text indicates litigants have a
right to a jury trial except in cases where courts traditionally decided cases without
juries prior to the constitution's enactment. Delaware, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine,
Missouri, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, and
Pennsylvania join Massachusetts in clearly requiring a historical inquiry in their
text. 82 Other states have suggested a historical inquiry is necessary to interpret

79.
80.
81.
82.

SCHAUFFLER, LAFOUNTAIN, STRICKLAND, HOLT & GENTHON, supra note 11, at 3.
U.S. COURTS, supra note 12.
MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. XV (emphasis added).
DEL. CONST. art. I, § 4 ("Trial by jury shall be as heretofore."); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 13 ("The
right of trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed shall remain inviolate."); ME. CONST. art. I, § 20
("In all civil suits, and in all controversies concerning property, the parties shall have a
right to a trial by jury, except in cases where it has heretofore been otherwise practiced;
the party claiming the right may be heard by himself or herself and with counsel, or either,
at the election of the party."); MO. CONST. art. I, § 22(a) ("That the right of trial by jury as
heretofore enjoyed shall remain inviolate .... "); N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. XX ("In all
controversies concerning property, and in all suits between two or more persons except
those in which another practice is and has been customary and except those in which the
value in controversy does not exceed $1,500 and no title to real estate is involved, the
parties have a right to a trial by jury. This method of procedure shall be held sacred,
unless, in cases arising on the high seas and in cases relating to mariners' wages, the
legislature shall think it necessary hereafter to alter it."); N.M. CONST. art. II, § 12 ("The
right of trial by jury as it has heretofore existed shall be secured to all and remain
inviolate."); N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2 ("Trial by jury in all cases in which it has heretofore
been guaranteed by constitutional provision shall remain inviolate forever[.]");PA.
CONST. art. I, § 6 ("Trial by jury shall be as heretofore, and the right thereof remain
inviolate."). North Carolina's and Kentucky's references to an "ancient mode" of jury
trial suggest that a historical inquiry is appropriate for them too. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 25
("In all controversies at law respecting property, the ancient mode of trial by jury is one
of the best securities of the rights of the people, and shall remain sacred and inviolable.");
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their jury trial guarantees, even when the text does not expressly support that
result.8 3
It is important to specify what an appropriate historical inquiry is here. In
states using some variation of "heretofore practiced" in their jury trial
guarantees, the historical inquiry is different from originalist searches for the
original public meaning of a provision or the framers' intent.84 Where original
intent looks at what a provision's drafters intended, original public meaning
looks to how a text was "reasonably understood by a well-informed reader at the
time of the provision's enactment."85 Instead, when Illinois's constitution (and
many others like it) protects the right to a jury trial as "heretofore enjoyed," it is
protecting the right to a jury trial as it was actually practiced prior to the provision's
enactment. An inquiry into historical practice requires state courts to understand
how the right to a jury trial actually played out on the ground when their
constitutions were ratified.
This Article argues that states tethering their jury trial guarantees to historical
practice will often find it difficult to sustain summary judgment's constitutionality.
A.

Each State Needs Its Own Inquiry

As with the text of jury trial right provisions, different states will sometimes
draw different lessons from their history.86 In fact, variations in state jury trial
practice initially led the founding fathers not to include a jury trial guarantee in the
federal constitution. After canvassing the diversity of jury trial practices among
the former colonies, Alexander Hamilton explained in Federalist Paper #83:
[N] o general rule could have been fixed upon by the convention which
would have corresponded with the circumstances of all the States; and
secondly, that more or at least as much might have been hazarded by
taking the system of any one State for a standard, as by omitting a

83.
84.
85.
86.

KY. CONST. art. I, § 7 ("The ancient mode of trial by jury shall be held sacred, and the right
thereof remain inviolate[.]").
Eg, Songer v. Civitas Bank, 771 N.E.2d 61, 63 (Ind. 2002) (finding that Indiana's constitution
"preserve[s] the right to a jury trial only as it existed at common law.").
See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Unifying OriginalIntent and OriginalPublic
Meaning, 113 Nw. U. L. REv. 1371 (2019).
Id. at 1373.
Austin Wakeman Scott, Trial by Jury and the Reform of Civil Procedure,31 HARV. L. REv. 669,
671 (1918) ("Whatever was an incident or characteristic of trial by jury in a particular
jurisdiction at the time of the adoption of the constitutionalguarantyin thatjurisdictionis not
thereby abolished.") (emphasis added).
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provision altogether and leaving the matter, as has been done, to
legislative regulation.87

Since each state has its own distinctive jury trialpractices, state courts should
not automatically look to English common law procedural devices to see if they are
analogous to modern summary judgment practice as scholarship about summary
judgment at the federal level has done. Two things make this especially clear.
First, states have often indicated that they do not wish to adopt English
common law in its entirety. Massachusetts, for example, provided that after
ratification, only:
[L] aws which have heretofore been adopted, used and approved in the
Province, Colony or State of Massachusetts Bay, and usually practiced
on in the courts of law, shall still remain and be in full force, until altered
or repealed by the Legislature; such parts only excepted as are repugnant
to the rights and liberties contained in this Constitution.88

To the extent Massachusetts incorporated English common law, it only did
so selectively; the way to tell whether a part of English common law applied in the
state was whether it was usually employed there. A later court decision confirmed
that "[w] e have not adopted any part of [English common law] that is peculiar to
that country, or that is contrary to, or inconsistent with, the spirit and practice of
our own institutions."89 In fact, in the context of a trespass case, the Supreme
Court has recognized that "[t]he common law of England is not to be taken in all
respects to be that of America. Our ancestors brought with them its general
principles, and claimed it as their birth right. But they brought with them, and
adopted only that portion which was applicable to their situation." 90
Second, court decisions interpreting state jury trial guarantees indicate that
they do not accept every English common law division of authority between judge
and jury. For example, several state courts have found a right to a jury trial on
equitable claims, even though there would be no such right under English
common law.91 Notwithstanding his own belief in the propriety of maintaining

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

THE FEDERALIST No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton).
MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. II, ch. VI, art. VI.
Judah v. McNamee, 3 Blackf. 269,271 (Ind. 1833).
Van Ness v. Pacard, 27 U.S. 137,144 (1829).
Eg, Trapnell v. Sysco Food Servs., Inc., 850 S.W.2d 529, 544 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (noting
that under Texas law, there was a broader right to trialby jury than under English common
law and that Texans had a right to jury trial of equitable claims); Proprietors of Charles
River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 23 Mass. (6 Pick.) 376, 399 (1828) ("Now
whenever a party in a suit in equity shall require that any controverted fact be tried by a
jury, the Court, by force of the article above mentioned, (though the act is not imperative,)
will be obliged to order an issue for that purpose, and thus the constitutional security is
preserved. So in regard to all the preceding statutes giving jurisdiction in equity, some of
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separate chancery courts and preventing juries from passing on equitable claims, 92
Hamilton noted that some former colonies allowed juries to hear equitable
claims. 93
This all shows that even if scholars demonstrate that English common law
procedural devices support or do not support modern summary judgment, it will
not end the historical inquiry for many states.
B.

The Fact/Law Distinction and Summary Judgment

Rule 56-which many states have copied 94-permits courts to grant
summary judgment when "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 95 The rule relies on the
assumption that juries resolve factual disputes while judges resolve legal ones. 96
That assumption, which the legal profession accepts as given today, was not shared
earlier in American history. Moreover, that assumption cannot support summary
judgment's constitutionality in at least some states. In several, it was still a jury's
right to decide whether a party was "entitled to judgment as a matter of law,"
because it had the right to interpret the law when states adopted their civil jury trial
guarantees. 97 Regardless ofwhether we now think it wise to have given juries such
authority, the fact that states did matters when jury trial provisions require
inquiring into how jury trials were actually conducted.

92.

93.
94.

95.

which do not provide for a trial by jury, this constitutional provision must be enforced by
the Court."); Mounce v. Byars, 11 Ga. 180, 185 (1852) ("We hold, that in Equity, as at Law,
the province of the Jury is to try the facts; and that the Judge has no more right, in Equity,
to pass upon the facts, than he has at Law .... "); Hoitt v. Burleigh, 18 N.H. 389, 389-90
(1846) ("We have settled that a party to a bill in equity has a constitutional right to require
a trial by jury, of a contested matter of fact, if he asserts that right at the proper stage of
the cause."); Salter v. Spier, 1 N.C. (Tay.) 230, 230 (1802) ("Upon an issue in equity,
submitted to the jury to ascertain whether satisfaction had been received by the
complainant for the property claimed in the bill, it was ruled by the Court that the
defendant's answer, affirming the fact, ought not to be read to the jury as evidence of it, for
the answer being replied to and put in issue, the defendant is bound to prove the facts he
relies upon as a defense.").
Hamilton, supra note 87 ("My convictions are equally strong that great advantages result
from the separation of the equity from the law jurisdiction, and that the causes which belong
to the former would be improperly committed to juries.").
Id.
Cooper, supra note 9, at 1246 ("Twenty-four jurisdictions-twenty-two states plus the District
of Columbia and Guam-currently have summary judgment rules that closely parallel the text
of Federal Rule 56.").
FED. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

96.

3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 379-80.

97.

Marcus Alexander Gadson, State ConstitutionalProvisionsAllowing Juriesto Interpretthe Law
Are Not as Crazy as They Sound, 93 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1, 6 (2019).
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Massachusetts is perhaps the foremost example of allowing juries to interpret
the law around the time its constitution was written. 98 As Nelson noted in his study
of how law functioned in Massachusetts from 1760 to 1830, "[t] he vital fact about
the jury system, however, was not that juries tried nearly every case but that they
had vast power to find both the law and the facts in those cases."99 Importantly for
the debate about whether demurrers or trial by inspection serve as an analog of
modern summary judgment, Nelson found that "[a]lthough there were several
devices at common lawin England for controlling jury findings of law and fact, few
of those devices were used in Massachusetts."' This state of affairs in
Massachusetts (and other states) may have stemmed from a few factors. First,
judges often sat in panels of three at trials in Massachusetts and sometimes gave
conflicting instructions about what the law was. 10 1 Juries would then have to
choose whose view of the law to follow, which gave them the power to decide legal
questions. Second, many of those who served as judges early on had little legal
knowledge or practice experience. Between 1760 and 1774, nine of the eleven
judges who served on the Massachusetts Superior Court had never practiced law
before, and six of them had never received any legal training. 102 They may well
have been limited in their ability to give legal instructions in a way modern judges
would not. Third, even for those who had legal training, they did not always have
access to a developed body of law. In New York, for example, Chancellor Kent
admitted "[t]here were no reports or state precedents .... We had no law of our
own and nobody knew what [it] was." 0 3 Finally, there was a distinctive view of
juries earlier in our history. Especially for antifederalists wary of the central
government, juries were "expected to interpose local values in order to prevent
the enforcement of metropolitan norms deemed unjust by local communities." 4
This was an important jury function whether the metropolitan norms came from
the King of England or from a legislature in a far-away capital city. In
Massachusetts, allowing juries to interpret the law was so well-settled that John
Adams, who wrote its constitution, called it "an Absurdity to suppose that the

98.

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has held that courts in the state must look to
whether a litigant would have had a right to a jury trial in 1780, when the Massachusetts
constitution was adopted, to determine whether that litigant has a right to jury trial today. See
Dep't. of Revenue v. Jarvenpaa, 534 N.E.2d 286,292 (Mass. 1989).

99.

WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE

ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760-1830, at 21 (Univ. of Ga. Press 1994) (1975).

100. Id.
101. Gadson, supra note 97, at 4.
102. Id. at 31.
103. Id.
104. Nelson, supra note 73, at 1660.
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Law would oblige jurors to find a Verdict according to the Direction ofthe Court,
against their own Opinion, Judgment, and Conscience."105
Courts in Connecticut recognized juries' right to interpret the law for most of
the state's history before adopting its first constitution in 1818.106 A later history of
Connecticut's legal system found that " [i]n charging the jury, the former practice
[up until 1807] was to submit to them the law as well as the facts, without
expressing any opinion or giving any direction how to find their verdict." 1 0 7 This
was the practice in spite of criticism. Zephaniah Swift argued that unscrupulous
lawyers exploited juries' right to interpret the law, which he found "a defect in
our judicial system." 108 When a lawyer knew "the law is against him, he w[ould]
insist on a trial of the question of law by a jury, and from their ignorance of the law,
[] hope for a decision in his favor. "109
In many of the thirteen original colonies, "[t]he courts almost never used
procedures analogous to summary judgment or the newly broadened Twombly
motion to dismiss.""0 Instead, "[a]s long as a plaintiff filed a writ in proper form
and a defendant responded with a plea of the general issue, a case would go to trial
before a jury that would have broad power to find facts and make law."" Indeed,
Nelson could find no record of trial by inspection, which Brunet argued was
analogous to summary judgment, ever being used in colonial America. 2

105. Gadson, supra note 97, at 4.
106. Witter v. Brewster, 1 Kirby 422, 423 (Conn. 1788) ("As to the other exception-that the jury
have found contrary to law and evidence-It doth not vitiate a verdict, that the jury have
mistaken the law or the evidence; for by the practice of this state, they are judges of
both .... "); Scovel v. Tyler, 2 Root 144, 144 (Conn. 1794) (stating juries are made judges of
the law and reversing grant ofnew trial on grounds jury got the law wrong); Pettis v. Warren,
1 Kirby 426,427 (Conn. 1788) ("Juries are judges of law as well as fact, as relative to the issues
put to them, and are supposed to have opinions of what the law is, though a willingness to
change them, if reason appears in the course of the trial.").
107. Eventually, Connecticut's "Supreme Court of Errors passed the rule [in 1807] that, in trials in
the several circuits, the presiding judge, in charging the jury, should state to them the points of
law involved, and declare the opinion of the court thereon." DWIGHT LOOMIS & J. GILBERT
CALHOUN, THE JUDICIAL AND CIVIL HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT 163 (Boston, The Boston

History Co. 1895). It is unclear whether juries were obligated to follow the court's direction.
As noted above, Massachusetts judges sometimes provided instructions on the law which
juries could disregard. Moreover, even if it became mandatory for Connecticut juries to
follow their instructions, it is unclear whether a practice that lasted eleven years at most,
and which was imposed by a court and not legislators or delegates to a constitutional
convention, should outweigh more than a century of allowing Connecticut juries to
interpret the law in conducting a historical inquiry.
108.

2 ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, A SYSTEM OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT, 259 (Windham,

109.
110.
111.
112.

John Byrne 1796).
Id. at 257.
Nelson, supra note 73, at 1657.
Id.
Id. at n.18.
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To be sure, states where juries had lawfmding authority eventually ended the
practice.1 3 Furthermore, some of the original thirteen colonies also prevented
juries from deciding legal questions. 4 Finally, there is either scarce evidence that
juries outside of the original thirteen colonies determined the law in civil cases, or
evidence showing those states rejected the practice outright. But importantly, at
least some ofthe states whose provisions require investigating how the law actually
played out on the ground historically will find it hard to use the traditional fact/law
distinction modern summary judgment practice relies upon. In fact, they
implicitly require courts today to adopt a different view of juries.1 5
C.

Early Summary Judgment Practice

Some states had earlyprototypes of summary judgment 116 prior to, or around
the time when, they adopted constitutions. Comparing these versions of summary
judgment still yields the conclusion that aggressive modern federal summary
judgment standards that states have lockstepped behind are in significant tension
with state jury trial guarantees.
Virginia had the first. In 1732, it allowed summary proceedings against
sheriffs or other officials who did not deliver public moneys due to citizens."' The
procedure allowed a plaintiff to file a motion for judgment, provide the defendant
notice, and otherwise skip the common law's elaborate pleading requirements. 18

113. By 1845, for example, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that "the nature of our
institutions, our whole legislation, and the practice of our courts, disprove the right of a
jury to decide questions of law." Commonwealth v. Porter, 51 Mass. (10 Met.) 263, 267
(1845). Importantly, however, this decision cannot tell us what the practice was in
Massachusetts in 1780, when the Massachusetts constitution was drafted. Nelson's
research as well as earlier case law confirm that it was entrenched practice for juries to
decide the law in 1780. See Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1, 25 (1808) (observing in a defamation
case that although the judge could provide the jury assistance in interpreting the law, the
jury must ultimately "decide the law and the fact"); William E. Nelson, The Legal Restraint
ofPower in Pre-RevolutionaryAmerica: Massachusettsas a Case Study, 1760-1775, 18 AM.
J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 23-26 (1974).
114. William E. Nelson, The Lawfinding Power of ColonialAmerican Juries, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 1003,
1003 (2010) (noting that New York, Pennsylvania, and North and South Carolina juries did
not have the power to decide legal questions in the colonial period).
115. See infra Subpart IILD.
116. See Robert Wyness Millar, Three American Ventures in Summary Civil Procedure,38 YALE L.J.
193 (1928).
117. Acts of May, 1732, c. 10, § 8, reprinted in THE STATUTES AT LARGE: BEING A COLLECTION
OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR

118.

1619, at 352 (William Hening ed., Richmond, Franklin Press 1820).
Charles E. Clark & Charles U. Samenow, The Summary Judgment, 38 YALE L.J. 423, 464
(1929).
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South Carolina provides another early example. In 1785, its legislature
passed an act "for the more speedy recovery of small debts." 11 9 This act allowed
county justices to:
hear and determine all suits for any debt or demand due by judgment,
specialty, or account for any sum or sums of money amounting to £5
sterling or for damage not exceeding £5 sterling, and not under 20s by
petition in a summary way, without the solemnity of a jury, and the said
justices are hereby authorized to give judgment and award execution
thereon."'

The plaintiff filed a petition detailing how the debt arose and documentation of the
debt with the clerk of court, who would in turn issue a summons to the defendant
at least ten days before the next court session.121 The court would then decide the
case without a jury.12 2 However, in 1786, the South Carolina legislature amended
the process to allow a jury trial if the parties agreed to have one, or if one party
requested a jury and agreed to pay the costs of doing so.123 This mode of
proceeding ended during reconstruction.124 Still, the 1785 Act might help us think
through how those who wrote South Carolina's first constitution would view
1 5
summary judgment."
Kentucky adopted aversion ofthis summaryprocess in 1805.126 This allowed
a person holding a "bond or note for the direct payment of money" to file a petition
containing a copy of the bond or note, assert that the debt was unpaid, and seek
judgment.127 Courts were to docket the case for the third day during the next
term.128 They could grant judgment on the amount specified in the petition plus
six percent annual interest without holding a jury trial "unless the pleadings
of the party make a jury necessary." 129 The Kentucky Court of Appeals
observed that this process was designed to provide "a more speedy remedy

119.

JOHN FAUCHEREAUD GRIMKE, THE PUBLIC LAWS OF THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 371

(Philadelphia, R. Aitken & Son 1790), https://archive.org/details/publiclawsofstatl790
john/page/370/mode/2up/search/jury [https://perma.cc/KVM3-F3FU].

120. Id.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 401.
Millar, supra note 116, at 203.
S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 6 ("The trial by jury, as heretofore used in this State, and the
liberty of the press, shall be forever inviolably preserved.").
Millar, supra note 116, at 204 (citing the Kentucky summary process law).
Id.
Id. at 205.
JAMEs T. MOREHEAD, THE PRACTICE IN CIVIL ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS AT LAW IN KENTUCKY
534 (Louisville, Derby, Anthony & Co. 1846).
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than was then afforded by the tardy mode of proceeding at law."" Alabama,
Arkansas, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, and Missouri adopted similar procedures
during the first half of the nineteenth century.131
After England adopted summary judgment procedures in 1855 and 1873,
several states followed suit in the twentieth century. 32 Only in Indiana and
Virginia was summary judgment available in all actions; in the other states, it was
only typically available in contract or debt cases.13 3 Importantly, these later
summary judgment provisions came too late to really help any historical inquiry
in many states. New York started using summary judgment in 1921,134 but its
courts have held that the relevant time period for interpreting its jury trial
1 5
guarantee is 1777, when its first constitution was ratified."
What level of generality to use when assessing whether one thing is
analogous to another plagues debates in legal scholarship. That issue rears its
head here. One way to frame the question is whether old summary judgment
statutes that would be relevant in a historical analysis allowed judges to resolve
cases without juries. Another way to frame it is whether modern summary
judgment practice differs from older summary judgment statutes sufficiently that
the drafters ofthose statutes and litigants who invoked them would not necessarily
view modern practice as a logical outgrowth of old practice.
If the goal is to hew closely to historical practice, the latter seems the more
appropriate question. Under the latter inquiry, modern federal summary
judgment standards are enough of a departure from historical practice to raise
serious constitutional questions. Old summary judgment statutes typically (1)
were only available to the plaintiff, (2) were available in only very limited kinds of
cases that the legislature viewed as especially likely to be obvious, and (3)
sometimes still permitted a party to insist on a jury trial.

130.
131.
132.
133.

Kentucky Ins. Co. v. Hawkins, 7 Ky. (4 Bibb) 470,470 (1816).
Millar, supra note 116, at 210-13.
Haramati, supranote 4, at 179-80.
Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Distorted Mirror: The Supreme Court's Shimmering View of
Summary Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication Process, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95,
139 (1988).
134. Leonard S. Saxe, Summary Judgments in New York a StatisticalStudy, 19 CORNELL L.Q. 237,
237 (1934).
135. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S. v. State, 550 N.E.2d 919, 921 (N.Y. 1990) ("Consequently,
all cases afforded a jury trial under the common law prior to 1777 and all cases to which the
Legislature extended a right to a jury trial prior to 1894 come within the present
constitutional guarantee in article I, § 2.").
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D.

Historical Conceptions of the Jury

As alluded to, perhaps the biggest reason that a historical approach to
interpreting jury trial guarantees does not support summary judgment is that
earlier generations viewed the jury's role differently than we seem to today.
Historically, there have been several justifications for juries. First, some have
defended juries as legitimizing the legal system. 136 According to this view, "[t]he
jury is the institution through which community values enter the judicial process
and through which the legal system maintains its connection with public
sentiment."" The fact that juries comprise laypeople and not judges or lawyers
may make the community more likely to accept its decisions, especially in
controversial or difficult cases. 138
A second justification has been that juries are a forum for representative
democracy. 139 This is true in at least two ways. First, the people who comprise
juries come from more diverse backgrounds than judges do.1" Economic
diversity may have mattered a great deal to antifederalists who pushed for a civil
jury trial guarantee because they believed juries allowed "men of the 'middling
sort' [to] introduce[] themselves into government through the jury."" Indeed,
given the average wealth of politicians and judges, the jury may be one of the few
political institutions in which citizens of modest means can participate. Second,
juries can serve as ad hoc policymakers.14 2 When a jury awards large damages
against, say, a polluter, or finds defendants liable for behavior the legislature has
not addressed, those decisions can create substantive standards that prospective
litigants must follow. In other cases, juries can nullify legislation, which can be
thought of as a sort of popular veto.
A third justification has been that juries can check judges. At the founding,
some worried that judges were "untrustworthy,... exposed to bribes,... fond of
power and authority, and ... the dependent and subservient creatures of the
legislature."" 3 As a one-offinstitution that did not have to worry about keeping or
maintaining power, juries could step in to protect regular citizens from such

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

The CivilJury, 110 HARV. L. REv. 1408, 1432 (1997).
Id. at 1433.
See id.
Id. at 1436.
Gadson, supra note 97, at 32.
The CivilJury, supra note 136, at 1437.
Id. at 1439-40.
Rachel E. Barkow, Rechargingthe Jury: The CriminalJury's ConstitutionalRole in an Era of
Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 33, 56 (2003)(quoting LYSANDER SPOONER, TRIAL BY
JURY 124 (London, Sampson Low, Son, & Co. 1852).
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judges. This view of juries has been invoked both to support jury nullification and
to allow juries to interpret the law. 144 Thomas Jefferson explicitly noted that when
judges "maybe suspected ofbias, the jury undertake to decide both law and fact."" 5
Today, we might think that juries can still be a valuable check because political
pressures or the need to raise money might influence, at the very least, elected
judges.
Community values cannot influence the legal system via juries when
summary judgment prevents them from deciding cases. Nor can communities use
the legal system as a form of representative democracy or to check judges. We may
not share the founding generation's view of juries any longer. But states that
purportedly apply the jury trial provision as the founding generation would have
are locked into those older conceptions of juries. In some states, the roles the
framers of the constitutions would have ascribed to juries do not make any room
for summary judgment. In others, those roles preclude modern applications of
summary judgment.

IV.

THE TEXT OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL JURY TRIAL GUARANTEES

For jurists across the spectrum, what a constitutional provision's text
says matters. Some have suggested that the text is especially important when
interpreting state constitutions. 146 This might be because state constitutions
are usually easier to amend than the federal constitution, meaning that judges
feel less need to take it upon themselves to update the meaning of an old
provision as new challenges arise.147
It might also be because state
detailed
than federal counterparts.148
are
often
more
provisions
constitutional
Consider the difference between the Seventh Amendment and Article II § 7 of
Arkansas's constitution. The Seventh Amendment guarantees that "[i]n suits
at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the

144.

Gadson, supra note 97, at 27.

145.

THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 135 (Boston, Lilly & Wait 1832).

146. Jack L. Landau, Some Thoughts About State ConstitutionalInterpretation,115 PENN. ST.
L. REv. 837, 859 (2011) ("That the text must be paramount seems especially clear in the
case of state constitutional interpretation.").
147. Id. ("State constitutions, for instance, are much easier to amend. Thus, the common living
constitutionalism argument in favor of more 'flexible' interpretation of the federal
constitutional text-that the federal Constitution is so difficult to amend-simply does not
apply in the case of state constitutions.").
148. Id. ("State constitutions are also frequently crafted in far greater detail than their federal
counterpart. This is due, in large part, to the fact that, by the nineteenth century, the framers
of state constitutions saw their work in different terms from those of the framers of the federal
Constitution a century earlier.").
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right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by ajury shall be otherwise
reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the
common law." 149 Meanwhile, Arkansas's contains many more caveats and
qualifications:
The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and shall extend to all
cases at law, without regard to the amount in controversy; but a jury
trial may be waived by the parties in all cases in the manner prescribed
by law; and in all jury trials in civil cases, where as many as nine of
the jurors agree upon a verdict, the verdict so agreed upon shall be
returned as the verdict of such jury, provided, however, that where a
verdict is returned by less than twelve jurors all the jurors consenting
to such verdict shall sign the same. 50

Whatever the explanation, the text of Arkansas's guarantee probably answers
more questions than the federal guarantee's text does. As we will see, Arkansas is
not alone in writing a much more detailed jury trial guarantee than the Seventh
Amendment. This reality yields two insights. First, in many states, courts should
consult the text of their jury trial provisions to assess summary judgment's
constitutionality. Those that do will often find that summary judgment rests in
significant tension with their jury trial provisions' text. Second, the terms of the
debate about summary judgment's constitutionality at the federal level will
often be inapplicable to states.
A.

The Text of State JuryTrial Guarantees Often Precludes
Summary Judgment

A straightforward reading of many state jury trial provisions often does not
permit summary judgment. Consider Tennessee's constitution, which says
merely "[t]hat the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate,""' or Virginia's,
which goes even further and urges that the right to jury trial "ought to be held
sacred."" 2 The only time the Virginia constitution uses "sacred" is in its jury trial
guarantee. Combined with the religious significance of a term like "sacred,"" 3
that fact suggests the right to a jury trial may carry especially heavy weight. The
term "inviolate" simply suggests states cannot violate a litigant's right to a jury trial.

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
ARK. CONST. of 1874, art. II, § 7.
TENN. CONST. art. I, § 6.
VA. CONST. art. I, § 11.
In this context, perhaps the best definition for something "sacred" is something which is
"entitled to reverence and respect." Sacred, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/sacred[https://perma.cc/VYQ3-892B] (last visited June 26, 2021).
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In states like Tennessee, there are no carveouts in the text that might make room
for summary judgment. We can see this when we compare Tennessee's provision
to Georgia's and Maryland's. Georgia's provides that "[t]he right to trial by jury
shall remain inviolate, except that the court shall render judgment without the
verdict of a jury in all civil cases where no issuable defense is filed and where a jury
is not demanded in writing by either party."" It provides a clear carveout to a
defendant's jury trial right when there is no issuable defense. Maryland's provides:
That the Inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the Common Law of
England, and the trial by Jury, according to the course of that Law, and
to the benefit of such of the English statutes as existed on the Fourth
day of July, seventeen hundred and seventy-six; and which, by
experience, have been found applicable to their local and other
circumstances, and have been introduced, used and practiced by the
Courts of Law or Equity; and also of all Acts of Assembly in force on the
first day of June, eighteen hundred and sixty-seven; except such as may
have since expired, or may be inconsistent with the provisions of this
Constitution; subject, nevertheless, to the revision of, and amendment
or repeal by, the Legislature of this State. And the Inhabitants of
Maryland are also entitled to all property derived to them from, or
under the Charter granted by His Majesty Charles the First to
Caecilius Calvert, Baron of Baltimore.'55

Maryland's provision provides a clear carveout to a litigant's jury trial right
when the English common law of 1776 did not provide such a right. 156 States that
wanted to incorporate English common law limitations on juries knew how to do
so and made themselves clear when they did. Without any carveouts, summary
judgment arguably violates a litigant's inviolate right to a jury trial, at least as a
matter of plain meaning of the text. Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Idaho, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode

154. GA. CONST. art. I, para. I I(a).
155. MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. 5(a).
156. Id.
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Island, South Dakota, Virginia, and Washington15 . join Tennessee158 in providing
an "inviolate" right to jury trial with no carveouts that would support summary
judgment.

157. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 11 ("That the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate."); ARIz.
CONST. art. II, § 23 ("The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate."); FLA. CONST. art. I,
§ 22 ("The right of trial by jury shall be secure to all and remain inviolate."); IDAHO CONST.
art. I, § 7 ("The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate; but in civil actions threefourths of the jury may render a verdict, and the legislature may provide that in all cases
of misdemeanors five-sixths of the jury may render a verdict."); IND. CONST. art. I, § 20
("In all civil cases, the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate."); IOWA CONST. art. I,
§ 9 ("The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate; but the General Assembly may
authorize trial by a jury of a less number than twelve men in inferior courts. . .. "); KAN.
CONST. Bill of Rights, § 5 ("The right of trial by jury shall be inviolate."); MISS. CONST. art.
III, § 31 ("The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, but the Legislature may, by
enactment, provide that in all civil suits tried in the circuit and chancery court, nine or
more jurors may agree on the verdict and return it as the verdict of the jury."); NEB. CONST.
art. I, § 6 ("The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, but the Legislature may
authorize trial by a jury of a less number than twelve in courts inferior to the District
Court, and may by general law authorize a verdict in civil cases in any court by not less
than five-sixths of the jury."); N.J. CONST. art. I, § 9 ("The right of trial by jury shall
remain inviolate; but the Legislature may authorize the trial of civil causes by a jury of six
persons. The Legislature may provide that in any civil cause a verdict may be rendered by
not less than five-sixths of the jury. The Legislature may authorize the trial of the issue of
mental incompetency without a jury."); OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 19 ("The right of trial by
jury shall be and remain inviolate, except in civil cases wherein the amount in controversy
does not exceed One Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($1,500.00) .... "); OR. CONST. art.
I, § 17 ("In all civil cases the right of Trial by Jury shall remain inviolate."); R.I. CONST. art.
I, § 15 ("The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate."); S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 6 ("The
right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate and shall extend to all cases at law without regard
to the amount in controversy, but the Legislature may provide for a jury of less than twelve
in any court not a court of record and for the decision of civil cases by three-fourths of the
jury in any court."); VA. CONST. art. I, § 11 ("That ... in controversies respecting property,
and in suits between man and man, trial by jury is preferable to any other, and ought to be
held sacred; but the General Assembly may limit the number of jurors for civil cases in
circuit and corporation courts to not less than five .... "); WASH. CONST. art. I, § 21 ("The
right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, but the legislature may provide for a jury of any
number less than twelve in courts not of record, and for a verdict by nine or more jurors in
civil cases in any court of record, and for waiving of the jury in civil cases where the consent
of the parties interested is given thereto.").
158. TENN. CONST. art. I, § 6 ("That the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and no
religious or political test shall ever be required as a qualification for jurors."). Ren&e
Lettow Lerner has suggested that even a provision like Tennessee's requires a historical
inquiry.
See Ren&e Lettow Lerner, The Failure of Originalism in Preserving
ConstitutionalRights to Civil Jury Trial, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 811, 813 (2014)
("Nearly all the constitutional guarantees of civil jury trial refer to a historical baseline,
either expressly or impliedly."). She argues that the language "shall remain" "seem [s] to
demand a method of interpretation that today we would call originalist." Id. In view of
how explicitly many states have been in requiring a historical inquiry, such as by using
language such as "heretofore," or in Maryland's case tying the jury trial right to the state
of the English common law as of July 4, 1776, see supra note 155 and accompanying text,
I do not see language like "shall remain" as requiring a historical inquiry without more.
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There are three main ways to escape this conclusion. One could argue that
we have to read in English common law to properly understand these states' jury
trial guarantees, that another interpretive methodology besides textualism
supports summary judgment, or that summary judgment survives heightened
scrutiny. This Subpart addresses the first.
There are two considerations that might justify reading English common law
into state jury trial guarantees: (1) the intent of the framers of state constitutions,
and (2) an effort to achieve objectivity by looking at practices in use at a particular
time. This Article considers each explanation in turn, and finds that these do not
support reading in old common law limitations on juries in many states, and
hence, do not help the case for summary judgment's constitutionality.
1.

Framers' Intent

This Article has consulted the debates and proceedings of state constitutional
conventions to discern the framers' intent in this regard. In many states where the
text does not endorse a historical inquiry, it is questionable whether the drafters
meant to incorporate English common law limitations on juries.
Idaho courts have held that Idaho's jury trial right only applies today in
cases in which it would have under the common law in 1889.159 To be sure, its
territorial legislature had passed a statute making the common law of England
the law of Idaho.160 But the debates at its constitutional convention muddy the
waters. First, like many states, it deviated from the traditional practice of
requiring unanimous jury verdicts by allowing "three-fourths of the jury [to]
render a verdict."161 It did so even though a delegate recognized that:
The law of custom and the common law, and the practice ... of every
state, or nearly so, until within a few years, the rule has been that when
a man demanded a jury, it was considered a right that he had to a jury
trial by twelve men.1 2

Examples like Maryland's 1776 constitution and the many states that use "heretofore" in
their constitution demonstrate that states speak clearly when they want a historical
inquiry. Given this reality, we should be careful of reading a historical inquiry into a text
that does not clearly demand it.
1 59. See State v. Bennion, 730 P.2d 952, 957 (Idaho 1986) ("This Court long and often has stated
that Article 1, § 7 preserves the right to jury trial as it existed at the common law and under
the territorial statutes when the Idaho Constitution was adopted.") (collecting cases).
160.

1 PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF IDAHO 1889, at 230

(I.

W. Hart, ed. 1912).
161. IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 7.
162.

1 PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF IDAHO 1889,

note 160, at 231.

supra
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Second, a delegate recognized that practice in Idaho diverged from English
common law on the question of whether judges could direct verdicts; in England,
they could, while in Idaho, they could not. 163 That same delegate went on to say
that "I don't believe much in the old hoary antiquities of common law." 164
Indiana courts have incorporated English common law as of the date the
Indiana constitution was ratified in 1852.165 But the drafters made clear they
wanted:
[T] o abolish the separate forms of action now in use; and to provide for
a uniform mode of pleading, without distinction between law and

equity... [because] [a] s the lawnow is a man may prosecute a perfectly
just claim, but if he commence suit on what an arbitrary rule calls the
wrong side of the court, he cannot recover.1 66

The most definitive statement about incorporating English common law was
a proposal that "the committee on law and law reform report an article to this
Convention as soon as practicable, for the purpose of abolishing the common law
of England." 167
In Iowa, delegates voted down a resolution that "[s] uch parts ofthe Common
Law as are not repugnant to this constitution, and the statutory laws of this State,
shall be, and continue [to be], the law of this State, subject to such changes and
alterations as the General Assembly may make therein." 168 One delegate
acknowledged that even though "there are such provisions as this put in the
constitutions of the other States, and perhaps properly enough when they have
a common law of their own [,]" the proposal was inappropriatebecause "we are
not old enough ... to have any common law of our own. "169 Another disputed
this characterization, suggesting that "our common law here is the same as it
was in New York at the time their constitution was adopted, and the same that
it is in Illinois, Indiana, Wisconsin, Michigan, and other States,"17 0 and then that
Iowa had "the common law of the country, as we received it from our English
ancestors."1 71 To make matters even more confusing, while two delegates believed
it important to enshrine the common law in the Iowa constitution, a third
163. Id. at 228.
164. Id. at 229.
165. Songer v. Civitas Bank, 771 N.E.2d 61, 63 (Ind. 2002).
166.

JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION OF THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF INDIANA TO AMEND THE

CONSTITUTION 968 (Indianapolis, Austin H. Brown 1851).
167. Id. at276.
168.

THE DEBATES CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF IOWA 213 (Davenport, Luse,

Lane & Co. 1857).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at214.
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questioned its usefulness, because,"[a] sI understand the decisions ofthe Supreme
Court, the common law is now in force in this State, so far it is as applicable to our
institutions."" He was "opposed to putting abstract propositions in our
constitution[] unless they are calculated to secure some important right."1 7 3
The refusal to adopt this proposal and the debate about what it meant should
make us hesitate before concluding the Iowa constitution sought to incorporate
English common law divisions of labor between judge and jury that existed when
it was ratified.
South Carolina courts have held that the constitution's jury trial right applies
today as it did under the common law in 1868,14 but delegates to South Carolina's
1895 constitutional convention rejected a proposal that "[t]he right of trial by jury
as it existed at the foundation of this Government shall remain forever
inviolate."17 5
Of course, some conventions reveal that delegates may have intended that
jury trial guarantees be construed in light of English common law practices at the
time. In rejecting a proposal to allow non-unanimous verdicts, a delegate at North
Dakota's constitutional convention explained, "I hope the amendment will not
prevail, for if we are to retain trial by jury at all I think we must retain it as it was
known to the common law." 176 His view appears to have prevailed, as delegates
heard from and then rejected the view of a delegate who supported nonunanimous verdicts by saying, "I care not for the history of the matter, or
whether it originated in England or in the United States . .. I am in favor of
amending the old law."17 7
In many states, there is little evidence one way or another on whether the
delegates intended to incorporate English common law in their jury trial
guarantees. Along with states where the delegates suggested they did not want to
make their jury trial guarantees coextensive with the common law then in place,
the decision to read English common law into state jury trial guarantees requires
another explanation.

172. Id.
173. Id.
174. C. W. Matthews Contracting Co. v. S.C. Tax Comm'n, 230 S.E.2d 223, 225 (S.C. 1976)
("The section has been interpreted by this Court as securing the right to a jury only in cases
in which that right existed at the time of the adoption of the constitution in 1868; if the case
is a statutory action, a jury will be allowed only if the action is in the nature of a suit triable
at common law in 1868.") (collecting cases).
175.

JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 84

(Columbia, Charles A. Calvo, Jr. 1895).
176.

OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE FIRST CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION OF NORTH DAKOTA 361 (Bismarck, Tribune 1889).

177. Id. at 362.

1018

2.

68 UCLA L. REV. 988 (2021)

Practice at Time of Ratification of Constitutions

Another explanation is practice at the time of constitutional ratification
allowed for English common law procedural devices that sometimes took cases
from juries. The fact that these practices remained in place after the convention
could suggest that constitutionmakers saw them as consistent with their jury trial
guarantees.
Evidence that this is true (with caveats) in some cases comes from the first
civil procedure codes. In the mid-to-late nineteenth century, Iowa, Minnesota,
Colorado, Wyoming, Nevada, Kansas, California, Washington State, Oregon, and
Indiana 178 adopted such codes around the time they drafted their constitutions.
These provisions all allowed litigants to file demurrers. Brunet has argued that
demurrers are analogous to summary judgment motions because both: (1) are a
pretrial device, (2) allow a judge instead of a jury to decide a case, (3) allow judges
to decide obvious factual issues, (4) allow a jury to decide issues that are doubtful,
and (5) intend to promote efficiency in the legal system.179 To the extent drafters
of those civil procedure codes would have agreed with this characterization of
demurrers, perhaps constitutionmakers did mean for English common law
practice to inform how future courts interpreted jury trial guarantees. It is worth
noting, though, that none of these codes provide for trial by inspection, which
Brunet found perhaps the best common law analogue of summary judgment.180
So we cannot assume that trial by inspection was a procedure that policymakers
found acceptable, let alone constitutionally permissible. That said, several states
have passed statutes explicitly incorporating in whole, or in part, the common
law.181 For these states, an important question not explored here is whether
modern summary judgment practice is consistent with those common law
reception statutes.
Certainly, just because the generation that wrote a constitution (or
provision) engaged in a practice does not mean that everyone would find that the
practice passed constitutional muster. For example, many legal scholars and
judges have rejected the notion that school segregation is constitutional since
most, if not all, schools were segregated when the Fourteenth Amendment was

178. IOwA CODE § 1737 (1851); MINN. STAT. ch. 122 (1851); COLO. CODE CIV. PROC. § 49 (1877);
Wyo. REV. STAT. § 2446 (1887); NEV. STAT. ch. 103, §§ 40-42 (1861); KAN. STAT. ch. 95, § 96
(1897); Cal. Practice Act § 40 (1851); IND. CODE art. 5, § 50 (1852); WASH. CODE ch. 5, § 74
(1881); OR. STAT. ch. 1, § 38 (1854).
179. Brunet, supra note 72, at 1629.
180. Id. at 1631.
181. See John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary:
InstitutionalizingJudicialRestraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1027 n.307 (2002).
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ratified.182 Here, even if some of those who drafted the state constitutions behaved
as though English common law procedures were consistent with jury trial
guarantees, that does not mean we are bound by that fact, especially if we are
paying especially close attention to the text itself.
If the case for reading English common law into these jury trial guarantees is
weak, two consequences follow. First, one who wishes to argue that summary
judgment is constitutional will have to argue for a living constitutionalist
framework or that summary judgment survives heightened scrutiny. Second, the
debate scholars have had about summary judgment at the federal level-where the
Seventh Amendment incorporates English common law-is unhelpful to many
states. Even if scholars can prove or disprove that summary judgment is
analogous to common law procedural devices, that finding will not help states that
did not incorporate English common law decide whether summary judgment is
constitutional.
B.

The Text of Some Jury Trial Guarantees Does Support
Summary Judgment

Of course, I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge that some states can
fully embrace federal summary judgment standards and remain on firm
constitutional footing.
1.

Some States Provide No Right to Civil Juries

As it happens, at least three states need not worry about whether summary
judgment is constitutional at all. They can follow the Celotex trilogy without
constraint. Judges evaluating motions for summary judgment are free to ignore
Matsushita's admonition that "[o]n summary judgment the inferences to be
drawn from the underlying facts ... must be viewed in the light most favorable to
the party opposing the motion."183 They can decide summary judgment motions
even when there are clear disputes of material fact without constitutional
constraint. That is because their constitutions do not provide a right to a jury trial.

182. Ronald Turner, The Problematicsof the Brown-Is-OriginalistProject,23 J.L. & POL'Y 591, 608
(2015) ("With regard to school segregation, a social rights issue, it is noteworthy that African
Americans 'were almost universally excluded from, or segregated in, public schools when
the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted."') (quoting MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM
CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 19

(2004)).
183. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citing United
States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)).
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Colorado's Article II §23 provides that "[t]he right of trial by jury shall
remain inviolate in criminal cases; but a jury in civil cases in all courts, or in
criminal cases in courts not of record, may consist of less than twelve persons, as
may be prescribed by law."184 The text indicates that the right to a jury trial is
"inviolate" in criminal cases but not in civil cases. Nor can we consider this an
unintentional oversight. At Colorado's constitutional convention, a delegate
proposed that "the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate."185 This proposal
would have covered both civil and criminal cases. At another point, a majority
report from the committee on the bill of rights proposed that "[t]he right of trial
by jury as heretofore enjoyed shall remain inviolate, but a jury for the trial of
criminal cases in courts not of record may consist of less than twelve men, as may
be prescribed by law." 186 This would have tied the jury trial right to practice in
Colorado before its constitution was ratified, and assuming that civil juries were
used, guaranteed them. Both proposals failed, and Colorado ultimately adopted a
jury trial right that applies only to criminal cases. Colorado courts have confirmed
this reading after ratification.187
Louisiana's constitution does not guarantee jury trials in civil cases. Article I
§ 17 applies only in criminal cases. 188 This is also not an oversight. At its 1973
convention, a delegate proposed that "[i]n all civil cases, except summary,
domestic, and adoption cases, the right to trial by jury shall not be abridged."189
Later, another delegate proposed that "[t]he right to trial by jury shall not be
abridged in civil cases; however, except in those instances where the right to

184.
185.

186.
187.

188.

189.

COLO. CONST. art. II, § 23.
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION HELD IN DENVER, DECEMBER 20, 1875, at

60
(1907),
https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/sites/default/files/PROCEEDINGS%200F%
20THE%20CONSTITUTIONAL%20CONVENTION_O.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H4LCDBXT].
Id. at 91.
Eg., Scholz v. Metro. Pathologists, P.C., 851 P.2d 901, 906 (Colo. 1993) ("For over a century
this court has repeatedly held thatthis provision does not guarantee a trial by jury in civil cases
as a matter of right.").
LA. CONST. art. I, § 17 ("A criminal case in which the punishment may be capital shall be tried
before a jury of twelve persons, all of whom must concur to render a verdict. A case for an
offense committed prior to January 1, 2019, in which the punishment is necessarily
confinement at hard labor shall be tried before a jury of twelve persons, ten of whom must
concur to render a verdict. A case for an offense committed on or after January 1, 2019,
in which the punishment is necessarily confinement at hard labor shall be tried before a
jury of twelve persons, all of whom must concur to render a verdict. A case in which the
punishment may be confinement at hard labor or confinement without hard labor for
more than six months shall be tried before a jury of six persons, all of whom must concur to
render a verdict.").
Eleventh Day's Proceedings, OFF. J. PROC. CONST. CONVENTION 1973 STATE LA., July 6,
1973, at 3.
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trial by jury is guaranteed by this constitution, the legislature may provide for
exceptions to this right of trial by jury."190 Both proposals, which would have
guaranteed a right to civil jury trials, failed. Perhaps Louisiana's decision not to
guarantee jury trials in civil cases owes to its civil law heritage. 191 Civillaw systems
have traditionally not used juries.192
Wyoming's jury guarantee similarly only applies in criminal cases. 193 Its
Supreme Court has confirmed that there is no right to jury trial in civil cases. 194
Utah deserves special mention. Article I § 10 provides that:
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. In capital
cases the jury shall consist of twelve persons, and in all other felony
cases, the jury shall consist of no fewer than eight persons. In other
cases, the Legislature shall establish the number of jurors by statute,
but in no event shall a jury consist of fewer than four persons. In
criminal cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases threefourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be
waived unless demanded.1 95

The first sentence suggests that the right to trial by jury is only "inviolate" in
death penalty cases. This wording came to be even though a delegate at Utah's
constitutional convention proposed that "[t]he right of trial by jury shall remain
inviolate, but the Legislature may provide for a verdict of nine or more in civil cases
in any court of record."196 That delegate felt compelled to defend the jury system
itself. He lamented that the "tendency in the last few years towards the
abolishment of the entire jury system comes from certain influences; from certain
quarters, which are in the nature of things antagonistic to the rights of the

190. Forty-Seven th Day's Proceedings, OFF. J. PROC. CONST. CONVENTION 1973 STATE LA., Sept. 14,
1973, at 4.
191. Andrew Kent, The Jury and Empire: The Insular Cases and the Anti-Jury Movement in the
GildedAge andProgressiveEra, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 375,407-08 (2018).
192. Id. at 432.
193. WYO. CONST. art. I, § 9 ("The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate in criminal cases. A
jury in civil cases and in criminal cases where the charge is a misdemeanor may consist of less
than twelve (12) persons but not less than six (6), as may be prescribed by law. A grand jury
may consist of twelve (12) persons, any nine (9) of whom concurring may find an
indictment.").
194. In re GP v. Natrona Cnty. Dep't of Pub. Assistance & Soc. Servs., 679 P.2d 976, 986 (Wyo.
1984).
195. UTAH CONST. art. I, § 10.
196.

OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION ASSEMBLED AT SALT
LAKE CITY ON THE FOURTH DAY OF MARCH, 1895, TO ADOPT A CONSTITUTION 260 (Salt Lake

City, Star Printing Co. 1898).
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people." 197 This all suggests that Utah meant to join Louisiana, Wyoming, and
Colorado in refusing to guarantee a right to civil jury trials.
Yet, Utah courts have found that there is a right to jury trial in civil cases
despite its jury trial guarantee referring only to death penalty cases, though there
has been conflict on this point. 198 In fact, Utah has gone a step further and rejected
the Celotex trilogy wholesale. 199
None of this is to say that state courts without civil jury trial guarantees
should embrace the Celotex trilogy or aggressive use of summary judgment. There
remains a debate about whether the Celotex trilogy is wise policy and whether
summary judgment has gone too far. It is to say, however, that such states need not
constitutionalize these debates, for there is no constitutional barrier to consider.
2.

Some States Provide Clear Caveats in Their Constitutions
That Might Allow Summary Judgment

Michigan and Texas 200 have explicit caveats in their jury trial guarantees that
arguably permit courts to follow the Celotex trilogy and aggressively embrace
summary judgment. Article I § 15 of Texas's constitution provides, "The right of
trial by jury shall remain inviolate. The Legislature shall pass such laws as maybe

197. Id.
198. CompareInt'l Harvester Credit Corp. v. Pioneer Tractor & Implement, Inc., 626 P.2d 418,419
(Utah 1981) (finding a right to trial by jury in civil cases because of the "virtually unanimous
intention on the part of the framers of the Constitution to preserve a constitutional right
to trial by jury in civil cases and in noncapital criminal cases") with Valley Mortuary v.
Fairbanks, 225 P.2d 739, 754 (Utah 1950) (Wade, J., concurring and dissenting) ("So, in civil
cases, we are not required by any constitutional provision to grant the right of trial by jury
as it existed at common law.").
199. Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, 116, 177 P.3d 600, 604 (Utah 2008) ("[T]his court expressly
declined to adopt the reasoning of the Celotex decision .... Utah law does not allow a
summary judgment movant to merely point out a lack of evidence in the nonmoving
party's case, but instead requires a movant to affirmatively provide factual evidence
establishing that there is no genuine issue of material fact.").
200. Georgia also has a caveat in the text of its jury trial right, but that caveat allows summary
judgment in much narrower circumstances than modern summaryjudgment rules typically
allow. The Georgia constitution provides that "[t]he right to trial by jury shall remain
inviolate, except that the court shall render judgment without the verdict of a jury in all civil
cases where no issuable defense is filed and where a jury is not demanded in writing by either
party." GA. CONST. art. I, § 1,1 XI. The exception to jury trials where a party does not set
forth an "issuable" defense permits summary judgment under at least certain circumstances.
Id. This might be because the defendant has actually failed to raise a defense, or because the
defense is legally insufficient. Importantly, however, Georgia only appears to authorize
summary judgment in limited cases. Permission to decide a case without a jury where there
is no "issuable" defense suggests that only plaintiffs and not defendants could invoke
summary judgment. Id.
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needed to regulate the same, and to maintain its purity and efficiency."2 01 The text
offers the legislature permission to regulate the right to trial by jury in ways that
increase its efficiency. Summary judgment arguably helps with that goal. It
decreases the number of cases juries need to hear. That means fewer summonses
for jury duty in the first place, and that many cases might have some issues or
claims resolved before a jury ever gets involved. The result is a lower burden on
the jury system. Giving the legislature permission to maintain the jury system's
"purity"might help as well. One explanation for reliance on juries is that they
are uniquely well-situated to resolving factual disputes. This is because jurors
often have different life experiences and perspectives. The ability to deliberate and
incorporate these different perspectives arguably gives the jury an advantage over
a single trial judge in resolving such disputes.202 If summary judgment resolves
easy issues without involving a jury, the jury has more time to focus on resolving
precisely the sort of questions modern lawyers and judges might think it is best
equipped to handle.

Michigan's Article I §14 provides that "[t]he right of trial by jury shall
remain, but shall be waived in all civil cases unless demanded by one of the parties
in the manner prescribed by law."2 03 This is much narrower than an earlier

iteration of the right, which provided simply that " [t]he right of trial by jury shall
remain inviolate."2 04 The text suggests a presumption that civil cases do not
involve juries. Moreover, allowing the law to "prescribe"how parties can demand
a jury trial might authorize summary judgment. The legislature could condition a
demand for a jury trial on showing that there are bona fide factual disputes.
Indeed, a delegate to California's 1878 constitutional convention worried that
allowing the legislature to decide how parties could waive a jury trial would permit
it to say, "unless a man sneezes three times before going into the Courtroom,
his right to a trial by jury is waived." 2 05 At that point, the delegate said, "Ifyou are
going to give the Legislature any such power as that over the rights held sacred by
the American people, you might as well leave it all to the Legislature."2 06
So, there are some states whose constitutions have authorized even modern
forms of summary judgment. Examining the text of these states' provisions

201. TEx. CONST. art. I, § 15.
202. Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Are Twelve HeadsBetter Than One?, 52 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 205,206
(1989).
203. MICH. CONST. art. I, § 14.
204. MICH. CONST. art. I, § 9 (1835).
205.

1 DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF

CALIFORNIA 255 (Sacramento, J. D. Young 1880).
206. Id.
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buttresses the conclusion that other states' jury trial guarantees, which are
framed much more expansively, do not support summary judgment.
C.

Some States Should Follow the Contours of the Federal Debate

I would also be remiss if I did not acknowledge that some states should
follow the contours of the debate about summary judgment's constitutionality
at the federal level. In large part, the debate over whether summary judgment
is constitutional rests on a historical inquiry. Is summary judgment close
enough to procedures commonly used in 1791 to pass constitutional muster?
It is appropriate for some states to consider whether summary judgment is
consistent with English common law procedures in use when their constitutions
were ratified. Maryland's comes closest to hewing directly to the historical
approach used in debates at the federal level. Its constitution provides that:
[T]he Inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the Common Law of
England, and the trial by Jury, according to the course of that Law,
and to the benefit of such of the English statutes as existed on the
Fourth day of July, seventeen hundred and seventy-six; and which, by
experience, have been found applicable to their local and other
circumstances, and have been introduced, used and practiced by the
Courts of Law or Equity; and also of all Acts of Assembly in force on
the first day of June, eighteen hundred and sixty-seven; except such as
may have since expired, or may be inconsistent with the provisions of
this Constitution; subject, nevertheless, to the revision of, and
amendment or repeal by, the Legislature of this State.207

This guarantee directs Maryland courts to consider the state of English
common law in 1776, which should not greatly differ from the common law in
1791.208
Two other states explicitly tie their jury trial guarantees to practice at
common law, though they leave open an important question: at what point in
time is the common law "frozen"? This question matters because common law
procedures governing juries varied with time. At one time, for example, a process

207. MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights, § 5(a).
208. For example, judges and lawyers in 1776 and 1791 would have drawn on William
Blackstone's treatise, Commentaries on the Laws of England, which was published in 1768.
See Suja A. Thomas, Why the Motion to Dismiss Is Now Unconstitutional,92 MINN. L. REv.
1851, 1886 n.192, 1867 n.95 (2008) (using Blackstone's treatise in the context of an argument
that modern federal pleading standards are unconstitutional).
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called "attaint" punished jurors who reached erroneous verdicts.2 09 Attaint was
only formally abolished in England in 1825, though it appears to have fallen into
disuse earlier.210 Massachusetts authorized attaint in a 1672 statute and used it
until 1684.21 If these provisions incorporated English common law as of, say,
1607 when colonists settled Jamestown, attaint as a remedy would be
constitutionally protected.
Alaska's constitution provides that "[i]n civil cases where the amount in
controversy exceeds two hundred fifty dollars, the right of trial by a jury of
twelve is preserved to the same extent as it existed at common law." 21 2
Meanwhile, West Virginia's constitution almost completely copies the
Seventh Amendment and provides:
In suits at common law, where the value in controversy exceeds twenty
dollars exclusive of interest and costs, the right of trial by jury, if
required by either party, shall be preserved; and in such suit in a court
of limited jurisdiction a jury shall consist of six persons. No fact tried by
a jury shall be otherwise reexamined in any case than according to the
rule of court or law. 213

Without guidance about when to freeze the jury trial right, the most logical
date would be when the state constitution was adopted. The West Virginia
Supreme Court has done this.214 For West Virginia, Alaska, and Maryland, the
debate about summary judgment's constitutionality at the federal level is
highly relevant to how they should construe their jury trial guarantees.

V.

OTHER INTERPRETIVE APPROACHES AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Thus far, this Article has considered the text and history of state
constitutional provisions. But those are not the only frameworks scholars,
judges, and lawyers use to interpret constitutions. Nor, even if they are the
primary consideration, are they necessarily dispositive. However, even under the
two remaining approaches, summary judgment is in tension with state jury trial

209. John Marshall Mitnick, FromNeighbor-Witness to Judge of Proofs: The Transformationof the
English Civil Juror,32 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 201,203 (1988).

210. Id. at 211.
211. Renee B. Lettow, New Trialfor Verdict Against Law:Judge-JuryRelations in EarlyNineteenthCenturyAmerica, 71 NOTREDAMEL. REV. 505,516 (1996).
212. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 16.
213. W.VA. CoNST. art. III § 13.
214. Perilli v. Bd. of Educ. Monongalia Cnty., 387 S.E.2d 315, 317 (W. Va. 1989) ("This Court has
used a modified historical test for determining common-law 'legal' rights to jury trial.
That is, the right is conceptually fixed ('preserved') as of the time the amendment was
ratified (in this case, 1880).").
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guarantees. In addition, there is a potentially compelling structural argument that
states should not constitutionally embrace federal summary judgment standards.
A.

Living Constitutionalism

Unlike originalism, living constitutionalism holds that a constitutional
provision's meaning is not fixed at a point in time. Instead, as society changes, so
might a constitutional provision's meaning.215
Suffice it to say, living
inspired a great deal of
and
its
opposite,
originalism,
have
constitutionalism
debate. This Article does not attempt to resolve that debate. Before going further,
though, we must recognize that many state constitutional jury trial guarantees
explicitly preclude living constitutionalist interpretation. New York's, for
example, provides that "[t] rial by jury in all cases in which it has heretofore been
guaranteed by constitutional provision shall remain inviolate forever." 2 16
Delaware, Illinois, Maine, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Mexico, and
Massachusetts also use "heretofore" or similar language to require a historical
inquiry. 217 A command to focus on jury trials as practiced at a certain point in the
past does not allow courts to factor in subsequent societal development. 218
Moreover, courts have usually decided to engage in historical inquiries to
interpret jury trial guarantees even when the texts of those provisions do not
require it. 2 1 9 Invoking the living constitution to justify summary judgment
would mark a major shift in how states approach the right to a jury trial and could
have profound consequences outside of procedural issues.
If anything, a living constitutionalist framework must account for how
important it is to provide access to justice. Unlike at the founding, courts provide
an important forum for historically disadvantaged groups to redress harms done
to them. Groups that were excluded from basic civil rights have come to rely on

215. JackL. Landau, Some ThoughtsAbout State ConstitutionalInterpretation,115PENN. ST. L. REV.
837,855 (2011).
216. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2.
217. DEL. CONST. art. I, § 4; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 13; ME. CONST. art. I, § 20; MO. CONST. art. I, § 22(a);
N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. § 20 ("In all controversies concerning property, and in all Suits between
two or more persons except those in which another practice is and has been customary and
except those in which the value in controversy does not exceed $1,500 and no title to real estate
is involved, the parties have a right to a trial by jury. This method of procedure shall be held
sacred, unless, in cases arising on the high seas and in cases relating to mariners' wages, the
legislature shall think it necessary hereafter to alter it.") (emphasis added); N.M. CONST. art.
II, § 12; MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. § XV.
218. Nelson, supra note 73, at 1658.
219. Eg, Songer v. Civitas Bank, 771 N.E.2d 61, 63 (Ind. 2002) (interpreting Indiana's jury trial
guarantee, which says, "In all civil cases, the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate" to
"preserve the right to a jury trial only as it existed at common law.")"
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the legal system to combat racial and gender discrimination. Cognizant of this,
Congress has instituted remedial schemes like Title VII to let plaintiffs use the
court system to achieve changes in their treatment that they previously could
not.2 20 If a living constitutionalist framework takes into account how the legal
system has evolved to help such disadvantaged groups, it would have to view
modern summary judgment practice with skepticism. That is because "[t]he
Supreme Court's 1986 summary judgment trilogy has had the effect, whether
intended or not, of depriving many deserving Title VII and ADEA [Age
Discrimination in Employment Act] plaintiffs of the right to a trial." 22 1
There is, of course, an argument on the other side. The conditions that made
juries comparatively strong historically in places like Massachusetts and limited
judges' ability to resolve cases without them no longer exist. As Nelson has
documented, early on in the republic, judges and lawyers sought to develop the
law in a way that would foster a state-level, and then a national, economy by
making the law more predictable for both ordinary citizens and business
interests. 222 This desire helped lead to increased professionalism among lawyers
and to judges more frequently granting new trials, limiting the jury's ability to find
the law, and limiting evidence presented to them.223 The result was supposed to
be more consistency in the legal system than was possible in earlier eras where
juries wielded more power. Today, we do live in an integrated national
economy224 that relies on consistency and uniformity in the law to thrive. On a
related note, Nelson would argue that most Americans no longer view the jury as
a place to protect local values against national or international ones, as
antifederalists who supported strong juries once did.225

220. Taxman v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. of Piscataway, 91 F.3d 1547, 1557 (3d Cir. 1996) ("Title VII
was enacted to further two primary goals: to end discrimination on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex or national origin, thereby guaranteeing equal opportunity in the workplace, and
to remedy the segregation and underrepresentation of minorities that discrimination has
caused in our Nation's work force.").
221. Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The Improper Use of Summary
Judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REV. 203, 255 (1993). See also Maritza I.
Reyes, ProfessionalWomen Silenced by Men-Made Norms, 47 AKRON L. REV. 897,954 (2015)
("In Title VII cases, there is a right to trial by jury, but these cases rarely survive summary
judgment in the federal courts.").
222. Nelson, supra note 73, at 1658-59.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 1660 ("America today is not, however, the America of 1791. We live in a nationally
integrated society and economy in which we depend almost entirely on people distant from
our own communities for nearly all of our needs.").
225. Id. at 1662 ("The main function that the jury can serve is to give local communities a
mechanism for obstructing and even nullifying the enforcement of metropolitan law-to
protect the periphery from the center. But few Americans really care about preserving local
power.").
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One could argue that summary judgment promotes consistencyin the law by
having legally trained professionals (judges) cognizant of precedent decide more
cases than they did in earlier eras and by limiting juries' ability to nullify the law by
taking cases from them where, under the applicable decisionmaking framework,
there is a clear right result. Moreover, summary judgment may promote efficiency
and predictability, which is particularly beneficial when the law seeks to encourage
economic development, by having the party best equipped to efficiently resolve
cases decide more of them.226 But under a living constitutionalist framework, we
should askwhether summary judgment has trulybeen used to strike ablow against
inefficiency or merely to strike one against the vulnerable populations who rely on
the justice system the most.
To some extent, any argument about whether summary judgment is
consistent with a living constitutionalist framework begs the question of why we
have juries today. As willbe explored later, states are uniquely suited to answer that
question.
B.

Heightened Scrutiny

As with the federal constitution, state jury trial rights are usually framed in
absolute terms. They are often "inviolate." But, over time, many courts have
shied away from a literal reading of constitutional rights provisions and have
given governments flexibility to overcome them under certain conditions.
Fundamental rights-to free speech, for example-are subject to strict scrutiny.
The Supreme Court has defined "fundamental rights" as ones which are
"objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition," and "implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty," such that "neither liberty nor justice would exist if
they were sacrificed." 2 The Supreme Court has also described the right to a civil
jury trial as fundamental.22 So have many state courts.2 29

226. As I will demonstrate below, it is questionable to what extent summary judgment actually
serves the goals of efficiency and predictability. See infra Subpart V.B.
227. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) (internal citations and quotations
omitted).
228. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy ex rel. Bogash, 301 U.S. 389,393 (1937).
229. Eg., Kloss v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 2002 MT 129, 310 Mont. 123 ¶ 53,54 P.3d 1, 12 (Mont.
2002) (Nelson, J., concurring) ("That this constitutionally guaranteed right of a jury trial is
'fundamental' and, therefore, deserving of the highest level of court scrutiny and
protection is beyond argument."); Arrington v. Daimler Chrysler Co., 9th Dist. Summit No.
22108, 2004-Ohio-7180, 2004 WL 3017313, at *7 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2004) (finding a
fundamental, though not absolute, right to a civil jury trial under the Ohio constitution);
Earnest v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Ala., 494 So. 2d 80, 82 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986) ("The
right to a jury trial is a fundamental right, and no person can be deprived of this right
against his will.").
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State courts have sometimes applied strict scrutiny in cases involving state
constitutional provisions.2 30 Strict scrutiny requires that government actions
infringing on a fundamental right be supported by a compelling state interest and
be narrowly tailored.231 Since summary judgment implicates the fundamental
right of trial by jury, the question becomes whether summary judgment serves a
compelling government interest and is narrowly tailored. There is reason for
skepticism.
The compelling state interests purportedly supporting summary judgment
would be efficiency and predictability. As to the first, in 2015, Americans filed
fifteen million civil cases in state court.232 Finding summary judgment
unconstitutional, which might also throw motions to dismiss into constitutional
doubt, 233 and requiring that each of these fifteen million cases get a jury trial could
at best prolong a process that is already lengthy. At worst, it would impose a
crushing burden that state courts would struggle to bear. If efficiency is a
compelling interest, perhaps reserving summary judgment for cases where a
reasonable jury would-theoretically-have no choice but to find for one of the
litigants counts as narrowly tailored. However, it is unclear whether an interest in
efficiency is similar enough to other interests courts have deemed compelling.
After all, if efficiency on its own were enough to overcome fundamental rights,
there would be few such rights left. It would be more efficient for police to conduct
investigations without having to get warrants or abide by limitations on what they
could search. Given how crowded some dockets are, an interest in efficiency
would support not just summary judgment, but eliminating juries altogether.
Indeed, state courts themselves have sometimes refused to recognize efficiency as
a compelling state interest.2 34

230.

E.g., State v. McCoy, 468 S.W.3d 892, 898 (Mo. 2015) (evaluating constitutionality of law

preventing felons from owning firearms); State v. J.P., 907 So. 2d 1101, 1107 (Fla. 2004)
(applying strict scrutiny to a juvenile curfew ordinance); Herring v. State, 100 So. 3d 616,624
(Ala. Crim. App. 2011) (applying strict scrutiny to a statute interfering with a sex-offender's
fundamental right to make decisions regarding the care, custody, and control of his
children).
231. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict JudicialScrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REv. 1267, 1273-74 (2007).
232. SCHAUFFLER, LAFOUNTAIN, STRICKLAND, HOLT & GENTHON, supranote 11, at 4.
233. For an argument to this effect, see generally Thomas, supra note 208.
234. E.g., Loder v. City of Glendale, 927 P.2d 1200, 1240 (Cal. 1997) (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting) ("Thus, the government's general interest in efficiency and employee productivity
is both less important and potentially more far reaching than the interest in public safety and
other interests that have been identified as 'compelling."'); Robinson v. City of Seattle, 10
P.3d 452, 468 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) ("We do not agree that the City's interest in cost or
efficiency is constitutionally compelling. To begin with, cost alone has never been held to
be a compelling interest justifying governmental intrusion upon a fundamental right.").
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Still, let us grant, momentarily, that an interest in efficiency can be
compelling. No broad judgment about whether summary judgment is narrowly
tailored to secure that interest is possible here. Each state would have to conduct
its own heightened scrutiny analysis. It is possible that summary judgment is
necessary to make the legal system function in some states, but not in others,
especially sparsely populated ones with fewer cases.
The second potentially compelling interest would be predictability. The
argument would be that society today needs predictability from the legal system
and that judges, instead of juries, are the ones to provide it. Where a jury is a oneoff institution that receives no legal training and does not have to justify its
decisions, judges received legal educations, have practice experience, and are
obligated to follow precedent. If it is true that judges are more likely to be uniform
in their decisions and that we value the uniformity that makes predictability
possible, we would at first glance want judges deciding more cases. Summary
judgment allows them to do that.
But that leaves us with two questions. The first is how much we value
predictability over other concerns, such as including the voices of laypeople in the
legal process or allowing juries to check judicial bias."'
The second is whether having judges decide more cases actually makes the
legal system more predictable. Although that argument holds intuitive appeal,
there is also reason for skepticism. Summary judgment involves decisions over
(often) factually complex cases that are meaningfully different from cases that
came before or will come after. How much guidance will decisions in those factbound disputes have for litigants whose facts will differ? There is still another more
fundamental problem: judges are not uniform in their decisionmaking. Evidence
of that abounds, from reversals on appeal, circuit splits, and five-to-four Supreme
Court decisions. In the context of summary judgment, there is evidence that
white judges and Black judges differ in how they approach racial harassment
cases.2 3 6 In a study of federal workplace racial harassment cases between 1981 and
2003 from six federal circuits, Chew and Kelley found that plaintiffs alleging racial
harassment win about three times as often with Black judges as they do with judges
from other races.2 3' That same study also showed that partisan affiliation was
predictive of how white judges adjudicated racial harassment claims, with white
Democrats being significantly more likely than white Republican judges to rule for

235. I turn my attention to that question in the last Subpart. See infra Subpart V.C.
236. Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Myth of the Color-BlindJudge:An EmpiricalAnalysisofRacial
Harassment Cases, 86 WASH. U. L. REv. 1117, 1121 (2009).
237. Id. at 1138, 1158.
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plaintiffs.2 38 How much more predictable does summary judgment make the legal
system if the decision turns on the race or political party of the judge?
C.

StructuralConsiderations

When considering how states should construe constitutional provisions that
have counterparts in the federal constitution, there are two schools of thought
about why state courts should interpret their provisions differently than federal
courts do. The first is represented by Justice Brennan's 1977 article in the
Harvard Law Review, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights.2 3 9 There, he lamented what he saw as the Supreme Court's growing refusal
to protect important rights under the federal constitution and urged state courts to
protect those rights under their state constitutions." The second school is
represented by Judge Sutton's 51 Imperfect Solutions."" There, Sutton suggested
that the proper reason for states to independently interpret their constitutional
guarantees rather than follow federal decisions was to consider "local
language, context, and history."24
So far, this Article has followed a decidedly Sutton-esque path to find that
summary judgment raises difficult questions under many state constitutions.
However, there is a Brennan-esque argument to be made too. The federal court
system has considerably pared back litigants' ability to receive a jury trial through

increased use of summary judgment and heightened pleading standards. Whether
or not individual decisions about pleading standards or summary judgment
actually violate the Seventh Amendment is the subject of the aforementioned
scholarly debate on which this Article need not weigh in. It is enough to note,
though, that if litigants cannot reliably receive a jury trial at the federal level, the
only place they can get one is at the state level. If one accepts that state courts
should raise the floor on constitutional rights when federal courts lower
them,2 " it makes sense for states to more aggressively protect the right to a jury

238. Id. at 1149.
239. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutionsand the Protection ofIndividualRights, 90 HARv.
L. REv. 489 (1977).
240. See id. at 490-91.
241
See generally JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS: STATES AND THE MAKING OF
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2018).

242. See id. at 177.
243. Clopton, supranote 10, at 423 ("Although I do not endorse this strategy with the vigor of Justice
Brennan, this Section observes that state courts similarly have the authority to use state law to
deviate from the Roberts Court's approach to civil procedure .... [T]his Section shows that
dismayed advocates of private enforcement and court access may find receptive audiences if
they look outside of the federal courts.").
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trial. That could mean outright rejecting summary judgment as a remedy (sure
to encounter great resistance), or citing state jury trial guarantees to
simultaneously increase the bar for granting summary judgment and become
more circumspect about granting individual motions.

VI.

A CALL FOR CLARITY

Almost as soon as the federal rules embraced summary judgment, a debate
about what it meant for the jury's role began taking shape. Arnstein v. Porter,24 4 a
famous Second Circuit case, is illustrative. There, the plaintiff alleged that the
defendant plagiarized several songs. 2 45 After suggesting that summary judgment
was inappropriate whenever there is "the slightest doubt as to the facts,"246 the
majority interpreted Rule 56 to preclude summary judgment even though it
viewed parts of the plaintiffs claims as "fantastic" because, a "plaintiff s credibility,
even as to those improbabilities, should be left to the jury."24 Otherwise, summary
judgment risked degenerating into trial by affidavits, which the majority found
had been long repudiated.2 48 It worried that robust use of summary judgment
would "often favor unduly the party with the more ingenious and better paid
lawyer," which would cause a "[g] rave injustice." 249 The majority's example of
when summary judgment would be appropriate confirms how limited the
majority felt its application should be. It provided the example of an action to
recover on a promissory note where the defendant set forth a copy of the called
check in an affidavit and provided a written response from the plaintiff confirming
the check's receipt-precisely the limited circumstances in which several state
rules would have permitted summary judgment. In dissent, Judge Clark argued
for a more expansive view of summary judgment. After reviewing the evidence,
he was "loath to believe that [his] colleagues [would] uphold a final judgment of
plagiarism on a record such as this."251 Instead, the case was really a vehicle to
launch two fundamental questions: "a belief in the efficacy of the jury to settle
issues of plagiarism, and a dislike of the rule established by the Supreme Court as
to summary judgments." 22 Rather than something that needed to be narrowly

244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
Id. at 467.
Id. at 468 (internalcitation omitted).
Id. at 469.
Id. at 471.
Id.
Id.at470-71.
Id. at 478-79 (Clark, J., dissenting).
Id. at 479.
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construed, Judge Clark argued that summary judgment was necessary to preserve
judicial economy."'
Scholars have had a parallel discussion. Many agreed with Judge Clark's
vision of summary judgment.254 They commended the Celotex trilogy's expansion
of summary judgment for helping judges eliminate frivolous cases and clear
dockets. 255 Other scholars have described expanded use of summary judgment as
potentially preventing meritorious cases from being heard or for reducing juries'
role in the legal system." 6 Miller, for example, has suggested that courts have
started to decide cases that would have previously been decided by juries in part
because of"an explicit or thinly veiled lack of confidence in jurors and their ability
to comprehend and digest the complex technical, scientific, or economic facts and
concepts needed to render a fair verdict in a specific case or on certain issues.""
At their root, then, debates about summary judgment boil down to a basic
question: what is the proper role for juries in the legal system? That question then
distills down into an even more basic one: what is the proper role of laypeople in
the legal system?
Everyone comes to this debate with their own intuitions about how valuable
juries are. I have a positive view. In addition to serving as valuable checks on
judges and conferring legitimacy on the legal process, I believe juries bring unique
advantages to the adjudicative process. At the trial court level, juries can deliberate,
consider multiple perspectives on a case, and reason together toward the best
resolution of a case.2 58 These are things a single trial court judge sitting alone in
chambers would be unable to do. If a juror has an incorrect understanding of the
case, other jurors can provide correction. If a judge has an incorrect

253. See id. at 479-80.
254. Eg., Martin B. Louis, InterceptingandDiscouragingDoubtfulLitigation:
A Golden Anniversary
View of Pleading, Summary Judgment, and Rule 11 Sanctions Under the FederalRules of Civil
Procedure,67 N.C. L. REV. 1023,1041 (1989).
255. Paul D. Carrington, MakingRules to Disposeof Manifestly UnfoundedAssertions: An Exorcism
of the Bogy of Non-Trans-SubstantiveRules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2067 (1989)
(arguing that summary judgment was superior to sanctions and managerial judging); William
W. Schwarzer, Summary Judgment and CaseManagement, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 213,220 (1987)
("The summary judgment procedure has utility in nearly every case, both as an offensive and
a defensive tactic. Even if no motion is filed, thinking through the analytic process, as
illustrated by the discussion in the preceding section, helps sort out the legal and factual
issues and define with precision the scope of the controversy. If a motion is made, whether
or not granted, it affords court and counsel a useful vehicle for narrowing the controversy,
identifying issues to be decided, and structuring the litigation for efficient and economic
disposition.").
256. Miller, supra note 7, at 1048-56.
257. Id. at 1094.
258. Gadson, supra note 97, at 32-35.
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understanding, there will not even be a law clerk to provide correction in many
states. 25 9 Ifwe think juries bring unique strengths to deciding cases, we might want
them deciding more.
That said, I acknowledge that there are thoughtful scholars who are more
skeptical of juries. Several scholars have questioned whether juries are useful
in certain cases. In particularly complex or technical cases such as antitrust, they
have suggested that lay juries cannot effectively decide the cases for want of
experience, training, and education. Such concerns have a venerable scholarly
lineage, tracing back at least to Alfred C. Coxe's 1901 article in the Columbia Law
Review. 6 1 There, he asserted that "[i]n the majority of civil causes[,] [the jury] is
an exceedingly cumbersome and inefficient method of reaching a result." 261 Such
cases included "[c]auses involving commercial transactions, expert knowledge,
careful mathematical calculations, or the consideration of long and intricate
accounts." 26 2 In line with such scholarship, several judges have found that jury
trials were inappropriate in what they deemed particularly complicated cases. 263
The Supreme Court itself has suggested approval of the practice. 26 4
Other scholars have gone further and questioned the jury's utility as an
institution generally.2 6 Shapiro and Coquillette declared that "[j ] ury trial in civil
cases is not an unmixed blessing; it is at least in some part responsible for delay in
the courts, for escalation in the size of damage awards, and for the high cost of
judicial administration."266 The solution, one writer argued a century earlier,
was that "[t] he duties now discharged by the court and jury should be allotted to

259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

Id. at 34-35 & n.237.
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a single tribunal, composed of one or more persons, trained by study and
practice for judicial office, and skilled in the investigation of facts."26z
In fact, delegates to state constitutional conventions sometimes expressed
similar sentiments. A California delegate worried about jury gullibility, because "it
[wa] s almost a universal rule that where parties want a jury their cases are bad.
There is no doubt but that it is better in abad case to have a jury." 268 Because of how
attorneys manipulated jury composition and what he perceived as negative
experience with juries, he concluded that "ifthe intent is to arrive at the facts and a
just conclusion, it is the judgment of bench and bar generally that this can better be
accomplished before a [c]ourt than before a jury." 2 69 Not only were juries
predisposed to wrongly decide cases, trialby jurywas "a special oppression in cases
where suits are brought by the poor, who are worried out by the expense of
litigation." 2 7 When accused ofwanting to "do away with the juries," a delegate to
Utah's constitutional convention "answer[ed] frankly, that if this young [s]tate
which is coming in, was financially rich and could afford to pay one gentleman as
chief justice, schooled in his profession, and two associates worthy to sit with him,
I would prefer it to all the juries in the world."2 7 1 Judges, he reasoned, would be less
corrupt than juries. 2
The debate about how laypeople can or should participate in the legal system
is also an international one. Many civil law countries have embraced some form of
mixed tribunals where laypeople serve alongside professionally trained judges to
decide cases.273 In Germany, for example, one professionally trained judge sits
alongside two lay judges to decide most criminal cases. 27 4 Moreover, in some
European countries, lay judges even hear appeals.2 7 5 To ensure that these lay
judges really are laypeople, several countries prohibit members of the legal
profession or members of professions that would acquire extensive legal

267. Renee Lettow Lerner, The Rise of DirectedVerdict: Jury Power in Civil Cases Before the Federal
Rules of1938, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 448,487 (2013) (quoting William Forsyth, Historyof Trial
by Jury, 92 N. AM. REV. 297, 309 (1861)).
268.

1 DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA, supra note 205, at 297 (statement of Delegate McCallum to the Chairman).

269. Id.
270. Id.
271.

OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION ASSEMBLED AT SALT
LAKE CITY ON THE FOURTH DAY OF MARCH, 1895, TO ADOPT A CONSTITUTION, supra note 196,

at 294 (statement of Delegate Varian to the Chairman).
272. Id.
273. See Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovic, Ears of the Deaf: The Theory and Reality of Lay Judges in Mixed
Tribunals, 90 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1031 (2015).
274. John D. Jackson & Nikolay P. Kovalev, Lay Adjudication and Human Rights in Europe, 13
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 83,96-97 (2006).
275. Id. at 118.
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knowledge, such as police officers, from serving.276 In establishing such systems,
countries gave some of the same justifications Americans have given for juries:
they help legitimate the legal system, bring in diverse perspectives, and check
professional judges.2 ' Lay judges have received some of the same criticism juries
have, including that lay judges are easily manipulated and lack the ability to engage
with complex legal issues.2 78
The debate about what lay citizens' proper role is and what tradeoffs we
should consider to balance litigants' right to a jury trial against the need for
efficiency, predictability, or the desirability of centralized versus local power is one
that state constitutions are uniquely positioned to help settle. The Seventh
Amendment requires an inquiry into whether summary judgment is consistent
with English common law mechanisms in the eighteenth century. It would help
the constitutional debate tremendously if clarifying language of the sort used in
state constitutions were added. That will not happen, especially in this polarized
political climate. It is hard to imagine two thirds of the U.S. House of
Representatives and U.S. Senate agreeing to send an amendment to the states or
two thirds of state legislatures agreeing to call a constitutional convention, let alone
that three fourths of states would ratify.279 The federal debate's terms were frozen
in 1791.
But they need not be in the states. They can choose whether scholars like me
who believe juries deserve a greater role in the legal system or scholars who believe
juries are an outmoded relic or scholars who fall somewhere in between have the
better view of juries. That is because it is generally much easier to amend state
constitutions. Those wishing to amend state constitutions have more tools
available, usually, "(1) voter adoption of legislatively-referred proposals, (2) voter
adoption of citizen-initiated proposals, (3) voter adoption of commission-referred
proposals, or (4) [] constitutional conventions."2 ' Numerical thresholds are often
lower. In New Mexico, for example, a bare majority of both houses of the
legislature and then a bare majority of voters can normally amend the
constitution.2 "1 "Thus, as compared to Article V, state constitutional amendment
processes are significantly more accessible and responsive to popular

276. Ivkovic, supra note 273, at 1033.
277. Id. at 1036-40.
278. Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovic, ExploringLay Participationin Legal Decision-Making:Lessons From
Mixed Tribunals, 40 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 429,441 (2007).
279. U.S. CONST. art. V.
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ConstitutionalAmendments, 41 Loy. U. CHi. L.J. 327,334-35 (2010).
281 See N.M. CONST. art. XIX, § 1.
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constitutional preferences." 8 2 The result has been much more frequent
amendment than at the federal level-as of 2016, there had been 7481
amendments to current state constitutions 2 3 and only twenty-seven to the federal
constitution. If the federal constitution is characterized by amendophobia, one
commentator has described state constitutions as characterized by
"amendomania."28 4
At the federal level, the debate about the jury's proper role is happening
primarily among judges and scholars, and will likely remain so. But since it is a
debate that goes to the core of what our legal system is, it is one that the people
should meaningfully participate in. State constitutional amendment-often
driven by voter referendum-is the most promising vehicle for that participation.
If the people believe that efficiency is especially important and can justify summary
judgment, they can adopt language like Texas's, which allows the legislature to pass
"such laws as may be needed to regulate the [right to jury trial], and to maintain its

purity and efficiency." 285 If the people believe that tethering their jury trial right to
some point in history is unhelpful, they can make that clear. If they believe that
civil juries are outmoded relics, they can follow Louisiana's lead and make no
provision for them. After engaging in discussion about what juries mean to us
today and whether summary judgment is consistent with that meaning, states can
give us valuable data about the value our society places on juries and, to the extent
they are still seen as important, what considerations justify taking cases from them.
My preferred outcome would be for states to reaffirm in emphatic terms the value
of juries and pull back on procedural mechanisms like summary judgment that
take cases from them. But even if this outcome does not come to pass, at least
judges, litigants, scholars, and citizens will have far more guidance about the jury's
role.
CONCLUSION

It is high time that states wade into the debate over summary judgment's
constitutionality. They have followed in lockstep behind federal summary
judgment jurisprudence even though their jury trial provisions do not follow in
lockstep behind the Seventh Amendment. As has been shown, those guarantees
generally have different text and history. Investigations into them are arguably

282. Jonathan L. Marshfield, Amendment Creep, 115 MICH. L. REV. 215,260 (2016).
283. Id.
284. Id. (quoting Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., First Things Last: Amendomania and State Bills ofRights, 54
MIss. L.J. 223, 233 (1984)).
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even more important than the debate surrounding the federal constitution
because state courts hear the overwhelming majority of cases in this country. This
Article sounds the alarmbell to warn many states that summary judgment violates,
or is in significant tension with, their jury trial guarantees. This Article also
outlines how and why states should think about summary judgment's
constitutionality differently than federal courts do. Finally, it asks states to answer
the question behind every debate about summary judgment-what role we should
accord juries-in a way that only the states can.
States will benefit from this work. Rigorously exploring their jury trial
guarantees and clarifying them might help resolve other important questions such

as whether they should fall in lockstep behind heightened federal pleading
standards represented by Twombly28 6 and IqbaF2 7 and what standard they should
use for directed verdicts and new trials.

286. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). The U.S. Supreme Court held that Rule 8
required a plaintiff to plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."
Id. at 570. It also criticized an earlier admonition that "a complaint should not be dismissed for
failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts
in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief' as having puzzled the legal profession
for fifty years and found that it had "earned its retirement." Id. at 561, 563.
287. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (applying Twombly's new pleading standard).

